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THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT----
CHARLES E. CLARK AND CEARLES U. SAiMENOW
Dissatisfaction in and out of the profession with the "law's
delay" has long been manifested. As an effective remedy for
such delay within the limits prescribed by its form and purpose,
the summary judgment procedure has become an important
feature of the most modern practice systems. Under this pro-
cedure judgment may be entered summarily for the plaintiff in
the more usual types of civil actions, on motion setting forth
his demand and his belief that there is no defense to it, unless
the defendant, by counter-affidavit, shows that the facts are in
dispute. The reform is usually advocated because of its effective-
ness in preventing delays by defendants, and in securing speedy
justice for creditors.1 But its advantages would seem to be
more than merely these. Because of its simplicity it is available
for the prompt disposition of bona fide issues of law as well
as of sham defenses. Except where a trial is necessary to settle
an issue of fact, the whole judicial process is, by this procedure,
made to function more quickly and with less complexity than in
the ordinary long drawn out suit.
It is proposed in this article to consider the rules and decisions
concerning summary procedure in the jurisdictions where it has
already been adopted. These may be classified in three groups
on the basis of the scope of the provision, the first being most
extensive, the second more limited but still effective within its
bounds, and the third applicable only to a few special types of
action. In the first group are England, the English colonies, of
which Ontario affords an example, and Connecticut under rules
just adopted. In the second are New Jersey, New York, Michi-
gan, District of Columbia, Illinois, Delaware, Pennsylvania,
Indiana, the Virginias, and, formerly, Kentuc and South Caro-
lina. In the third are Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas, Tennessee,
West Virginia, and Missouri. These jurisdictions will be con-
sidered in the order stated.
* This article is an amplification of a report prepared for the Connecticut
Judicial Council in the spring of 1928. On November 12, 1923, the judges
of the Superior Court of Connecticut, upon recommendation of the Con-
necticut Judicial Council, adopted an e.-tensive sunmary judgment rule.
This is considered below in the article.
1cf. Amu. Jun. Soc. BULm. XIV (1919) 100 as to the benefits of the pro-
cedure: "First, kt discourages the defense which is intcrposed only for
delay; Second, it gives the plaintiff a speedy judgment in the average
commercial case; Third, it encourages creditor. to resort to the courtz,





1855 marks the introduction into England of a summary judg-
ment provision restricted in its application to actions upon bills
of exchange and promissory notes.2 In much the same fashion
as did its successor in the Rules of 1873, it provided for special
indorsement of the plaintiff's claim upon the writ of summons
and for affidavits by the defendant as a condition of leave to de-
fend.3 It is upon the procedure in these rules that the English
summary judgment as it stands today is modeled. The object
of the rule was, as its name indicates, expedition and economy
in obtaining a judgment where the circumstances of the case
lent themselves to a shortened procedure.4 The intention of the
framers is well set forth in the preamble to the Summary Pro-
cedure on Bills of Exchange Act (1855) : 5 "Whereas bona fide
holders of dishonored Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes
are often unjustly delayed and put to unnecessary Expense in
recovering the Amount thereof by reason of frivolous or fictitious
Defences to Actions thereon, and it is expedient that greater
facilities than now exist should be given for the Recovery of
Money due on such Bills and Notes. . . ." It is worthy of
note that the Judicature Act of 1873, the final step in the English
reform of pleading, resulted in a very liberal extension of the
expedited process, rather than its abandonment as had happened
in America.6
With such a purpose in view, Order III, Rule 6 provides that
the writ of summons may be specially indorsed in certain speci-
fied types of actions. This, with Order XIV which, prescribes
the procedure to be used in moving for judgment, constitutes
the modern English provision.
2 The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 VICT. C. 67
(1855).
3 Cf. Rules under the Judicature Act, Order III, Rule 6 and Order XIV,
Rule 1, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 13 et seq., 156 et seq; 1 Y94BLY PRACTICM
(1923) 19 et seq., 141 et seq.
4Cockburn, C. J., in Walker v. Hicks, 3 Q. B. D. 8, 9 (1877): "The objcct
of the special indorsement is this: on the one hand, it is to have a very
prompt and summary effect in favor of the plaintiff, by entitling him to
apply to sign final judgment under Order XIV, and on the other hand, it
is intended that the defendant should have an opportunity of avoiding
further proceedings by payment of the debt." See Grove, T., in Bailey
v. Bailey, 13 Q. B. D. 855, 856 (1884), and Dowse, B., in Stewartstown
Loan Co. v. Daly, L. R. 12 Ir. 418, 419 (1884), to the same effect.
5 Supra note 1.
6 Compare the history of the English rules with that of the early Ameri-
can ventures in South Carolina, Kentucky, Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas
and Kansas, where the adoption of the Code marks their death. Millar,
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THE SPECIALLY INDORSED WRIT
The writ of summons may be specially indorsed with the plain-
tiff's claim in
. . . all actions where the plaintiff seeks to recover only
a debt or liquidated demand in money, payable by the defendant,
with or without interest, arising:
(A) on a contract, express or implied (as for instance on a
bill of exchange, promissory note or check, or other simple con-
tract debt) ; or
(B) on a bond or contract under seal for the payment of a
liquidated amount in money; or
(C) on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a
fixed sum or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or
(D) on a guaranty, whether under seal or not, where the claim
against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand
only; or
(E) on a trust; or
(F) in actions for the recovery of land, with or without a
claim for rent or mesne profits, by a landlord against a tenant
whose term has expired or has been duly determined by notice
to quit, or has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of
rent, or against persons claiming under such tenant." "
These actions fall naturally into two categories: (1) actions
for recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money; (2)
actions between landlord and tenant for the recovery of land.
DEBT OR LIQUIDATED DEMAND IN MONEY
Written instruments for pcaymcnt of iioizcy. Actions under
this head, including suits on bills, notes, clecks, and express
contracts, constitute the clearest and most usual case for the
summary remedy. Practically the only difficulty that has here
arisen is the indorsement of a claim on negotiable instruments
for interest and the expense of "noting" protest., This difficulty
was cleared up by a provision in the Bills of Exchange Act of
1882,9 which defined such claims as liquidated demands. Such
Three Amerian Ventitres h, Smmmaivy Ciril Proccdure (1928) 'S Y,=
L. J. 193, 203, 208, 210, 212.
7 This section does not appear among the Rules of 1873.
8 In the early eases, such claims were not permitted to be specially in-
dorsed. Rogers v. Hunt, 10 Ex. 474 (1854) (under the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1852); Skelly v. M'Kenna, L. R. G Ir. 24 (1879); Ryley
v. Master, [1892] 1 Q. B. 674. But cf. Rodway v. Lucas, 24 L. J. C. L. 155
(1855) (under Common Law Procedure Act: interest presumed on bill of
exchange in the absence of express stipulation); North(-rn Bank v. Chap-
man, L. R. 6 Ir. 25 (1879) ("noting" expenses agreed upon in composition
held liquidated demand.) Skelly v. M'Kenna, sztpra, would seem to be an
isolated instance where "notary charges" were considered proper inde-
pendently of contract or statute.
q 45-46 VICT. c. 61, § 57 (1882); Lawrence v. Willcochs, [1892] 1 Q. B.
696; Dando v. Boden, [1893] 1 Q. B. 318.
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claims are, however, still subject to the limitation in the Money-
lender's Act (1900) as to improper interest and excessive
bonuses. 0 As to actions on contracts, the claim must be liqui-
dated; claims for unliquidated damages cannot be specially in-
dorsed. This follows, of course, from the requirement that the
action be one to "recover a debt or liquidated demand in
money." '
Implied contracts. The general tenor of the decisions is that
claims under the indebitatus counts are within the rule'
Examples are claims: in quantum meruit for professional ser-
vices; 13 by a surety against his principal for reimbursement; 14
for goods sold and delivered; 1, and on a solicitor's bill of costs.10
Bond or contract under seal. A claim for liquidated damages
on a common money bond may be specially indorsed 1, but not a
claim on a penalty bond.18 Here difficulty has arisen as to the
10 Wells v. Allott, [1904] 2 K. B. 842 (excessive interest); Dott v.
Bonnard, 21 T. L. R. 166 (1904) (excessive bonus). The policy behind
the Moneylenders' Acts would naturally lead to a denial of the remedy of
summary judgment to usurious moneylenders.
11 That the claim be liquidated is the central requirement of the sum-
mary procedure. For various definitions of "debt" and "liquidated de-
mand," cf. ANNUAL PRAcTicE (1928) 16; 1 YEARLY PRAcTiCE (1928) 19;
Hibbert, LAW OF PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1921) 30; ODGERS, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE (9th ed. 1926) 47-49. See Kennedy, L. J., in Workman Co. V.
Lloyd Brazileno, [1908] 1 K. B. 968, 981: "... debt or liquidated demand"
does not mean "definite sum of money recoverable in the common law
action of debt in its most technical form."
12 See Farwell, L. J., in Workman Co. v. Lloyd Brazileno, supra note 11,
at 978 (action for installment due on shipbuilding contract): "I can see
no reason for excluding from the operation of Order III, Rule 6 any
action falling under any of the eight indebitatus counts which is brought
on an executed consideration for a fixed sum agreed to be paid for such
execution."
13 Lagos v. Grunwaldt, [1910] 1 K. B. 41 (1909) ; cf. Stephenson v. Weir,
L. R. 4 Ir. 369 (1879) (claim for work and labor).
14 Borland v. Curry, L. R. 4 Ir. 273 (1878) (suit by surety for sums
paid on notes and costs at principal's request); cf. Ahern v. O'Donovan,
15 Ir. L. T. 7 (1881) (plaintiff must show how the defendant's "liability"
arose).
15;M'Cawley Co. v. Campbell, L. R. 4 Ir. 410 (1879).
16 Cf. Larkin v. M'Inerney, L. R. 16 Ir. 246 (1885) (untaxed bills of
costs were referred for taxation, judgment to be entered for the amount
to be certified). Where the defendant delays too long in asking for taxa-
tion there will be no inquiry except as to extravagant items, and summary
judgment will be ordered. Jones & Son v. Whitehouse, [1918] 2. K. B.
61.
17 Stricklanid v. Williams, [1899] 1 Q. B. 382.
l8Tuther v. Caralampi, 21 Q. B. D. 414 (1888). See ANNuAL PRAcTiCn




circumstances under which summary relief may be given in
actions on mortgage covenants."
Judgm t. No separate provision is made for summary judg-
ments in actions on judgments. Such actions are, however, held
to come under the category of debts arising on contract under
the Rule. 0 Final judgment may be signed on foreign as well
as on English judgments.21 It has been held that a claim for
arrears of alimony awarded on an interlocutory judgment may
not be specially indorsed since it is still subject to modification
by the court making the order.22
Statute, guartnty or trist. A claim under a statute may be
.specially indorsed where the sum sought to be recovered is a
fixed sum, or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty.23 A
demand against a surety on a covenant has been held to be a
guaranty under the Rule.24 An action for principal and interest
due under a legacy has been held to be based on trust within
the Rule.25 The special indorsement does not seem to have been
often used in cases falling in this category.
ACTIONS BETWEEN LANDLORD AND TENANT FOR RECOVERY OF LAID
The tendency is to limit the application of this section to
the more simple litigation not involving devolution of land titles.::
Where complicated questions arise as to the relation of the
parties, summary relief is denied.7 The same policy is adhered
to where a forfeiture for breach of covenants other than the
: "Where the claim is purely for money, the right to relief is clear.
But where foreclosure and receivership are also prayed, Order XIV is
not available. Imbert-Terry v. Carver, 34 Ch. D. 500 (1SS7); Hill v.
Sidebottom, 47 L. T. R. 224 (1882). As to the effect of a receivcrohip
alone, it has been held, notwithstanding receivership, that a claim for
principal and interest due on a mortgage may be specially indorzcd.
Lynde v. Waithman, [1895] 2 Q. B. 180. But see Poulett v. Hill, [1893]
1 Ch. 277.2"Hodsoll v. Baxter, 120 Eng. Rep. 739 (185S).
2 l Grant v. Easton, 13 Q. B. D. 302 (1883). See ANNuAL PLcTics
(1928) 20-22 for an extended analysis of actions on British, colonial, and
foreign judgments.
22Bailey v. Bailey, sztpra note 4.
23Exclusion of penalties was added in 1883. This limitation is another
indication of a somewhat conservative attitude in England towards the
new procedure.
24 Cf. Caldwell v. Wren, 2 Ir. L. T. 146 (1S78) ; Lloyd's Banling Co. v.
Ogle, 1 Ex. D. 262 (1876).
25 Hamilton v. Brogden, 60 L. Jt. Ch. 88 (1890).
26 Casey v. Hellyer, 17 Q. B. D. 97 (1886); ef. PiUdngton v. Power,
[1910] 2 Ir. 194 (tenancy at will); Hopldns v. Coller, 29 T. L. R. 3G7
(1913) (year-to-year tenancy); Daubuz v. Lavington, 13 Q. B. D. 3,17
(1884) (attornment between mortgagor and mortgagee creating tenancy
at will); Hall v. Comfort, 18 Q. B. D. 11 (1880) (same).27See ANNUAL PRAcTiCE (1928) 25.
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non-payment of rent is involved. 28  The application of this pro-
vision is very much narrowed by these limitations.
PROCEDURE
Under Order XX, Rule 1 (a) when the writ is specially in-
dorsed, no statement of claim (or complaint) need be delivered,
but the indorsement is deemed to be the statement of claim. It
must, therefore, fulfill the requirements of a statement of claim,"O
and, like a bill in equity or a declaration at law, it should ap-
prise the defendant of a plaintiff's claimA° The indorsement
must show the connection of the defendant with the plaintiff's
cause of action.- The courts incline toward strict conformity
with the Rules,8 2 but bare technicalities may not be used by the
defendant as a defense.33
2sArden v. Boyce, [1894] 1 Q. B. 796; Stokes v. Tracey, [1920] 2 Ir.
R. 444. These cases explicitly recognize that there is no reason for the
rule but blindly follow precedent. See Arden v. Boyce, supra at 800;
Stokes v. Tracey, supra at 447. Where the tenancy is determinable under
the terms of the contract, it is held to come within Order III, Rule 6.
Keating v. Mulcahy, [1926] Ir. R. 214.
29 Cassidy v. M'Aloon, L. R. 32 Ir. 368 (1893); see Anlaby v. Praetorlus,
20 Q. B. D. 764, 770 (1888), to the effect that it must be signed and have
"Statement of Claim" written across the head of it. But of. Satchwell
v. Clarke, 66 L. T. R. 641 (1892), holding that the indorsement is not to
be tested by standards as rigid as those set up for statements of claim.
30 See Meade v. Mouillott, L. R. 4 Ir. 207 (1879): "The least that the
defendant should have is something that looks like (and in substance is)
a pleading;" Walker v. Hicks, 3 Q. B. D. 8 (1877); Bickers v. Spelght,
22 Q. B. D. 7, 3-(1888); Yeatnan v. Snow, 42 L. T. R. 502, 503 (1880),
as to the notice function of the special indorsement.
Cf. also Beaufort v. Ledwith, [1894] 2 Ir. R. 16 (in an action for rent
and arrears, averment of due date essential); Murphy v. Murphy, [1903) 2
Ir. R. 329 (where personal representative sues for arrears of rent, alle-
gation that deceased had only chattel interest in the land necessary);
Stirling & Co. v. North, 29 T. L. R. 216 (1913) (where the writ was in-
dorsed for claim on three notes before the last two were due, held, since
the defendant's counsel had not appeared to set up the defect, that the
judgment cured the writ); Aston v. Hurwitz, 41 L. T. R. 521 (1879);
Bickers v. Speight, supra note 30, prescribing the requirements of a special
indorsement under the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 as a guide
to the user of the Rules of 1883.
-Guinness v. Caraher, [1900] 2 Ir. R. 505; Seaton v. Clarke, L. R.
28 Ir. 514 (1891).
32 Walker, C., in Cassidy v. M'Aloon, supra note 29, at 369: "It is only
by virtue of a special statutory jurisdiction that final judgment can be
obtained summarily in an action. By the common law a plaintiff has
no right to obtain a judgment summarily, and if he wishes to avail him-
self of the statutory jurisdiction, he is bound to comply strictly with the
requirements of the Rules." See Gurney v. Small, [1891] 2 Q. B. 584, 586;
Parpaite Freres v. Dickinson, 38 L. T. R. 178, 179 (1878).
33 Cf. Veale v. Automatic Boiler Co., 18 Q. B. D. 631 (1887); see also
cases cited supra note 30.
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Liquidated denwnd.. The requirement that the indorsement
be one for a liquidated demand only has proved to be a most
serious obstacle to many applications to sign final judgment dur-
ing the early development of the procedure. The plaintiff was
forced to resort to the general procedure where the following
joinder of claims was presented: interest and "noting" ex-
pense on bills of exchange; - foreclosure and money due in
actions on mortgage covenants; 35 injunction and money re-
ceived; 36 also where interest was claimed when it did not appear
to be due under a contract or a statute .7 The inclusion of Order
XIV, Rule I (b) whereby the judge or master was empowered to
strike out any claim which could not be specially indors'ed, with-
out affecting the rest of the claim, relieved the plaintiff of the
necessity of adopting such a course of action31
Anzendment. The Rules provided that amendment of state-
ment of claim, whether indorsed on the writ or not, may be made
once, of right, the action to go on as if it had been made
from the beginning.3' It was held in Gurncy v. Snwl! 4 that
amendment after service of summons was too late. But in the
majority of decisions on this point, a more liberal attitude is
taken.- Such a point of view would seem to be more compatible
with the purposes of the framers of the Rules.
Once having properly indorsed a writ, the plaintiff may pro-
ceed to summary judgment by the process specified in Order
XIV:
"Where the defendant appears to a writ or summons specially
indorsed under Order III, Rule 6, the plaintiff may, on affidavit
34 Supra note 8; cf. supra note 9.
35 Supra note 19.
31 Yeatman v. Snow, supra note 30.
37 Sheba Mining Co. v. Trubshawe, [1892] 1 Q. B. 674 (money due for
goods and interest); Gold Ores Reduction Co. v. Parr, [1392] 2 Q. B. 14
(installments due on shares and interest); Wilks v. Wood, [1892] Q. B.
684 (goods sold and delivered and interest); see A:Nu;.L PrucE (1923)
18-20; 1 YEARLY PRACTCEm (192S) 26-27.
3 See BATY, SuR=nx CouRT PRACTICE (2d ed. 1924) 64.
39 Order -KVIII, Rule 2, ANNuAL PAC-TICE (1928) 40; 1 YanLrPy PrAC-
TICE (1928) 415.
60 Supra note 32.
4" Cf. Robinson v. Ralston, L. R. 8 Ir. 26 (13SO) (amendment strildng
out small unliquiaated claim); Roberts v. Plant, [1893] 1 Q. B. 597 (the
action after amendment under Order N-VII, Rule 2, goes on as if the
amendment had been made in the beginning); Pa:ton v. Baird, [1893] 1
Q. B. 139 (holding unnecessary a new appearance by the defendant).
Where the amendment serves to change a writ generally indorscd into
one specially indorsed, service of notice of the amended writ to the de-
fendant is necessary. Haigh v. Purcell, [1903] 2 Ir. R. 5G.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
made by himself, or by any person who can swear positively
to the facts, verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed
(if any), and stating that in his belief there is no defense to
the action, apply to a Judge for liberty to enter final judg-
ment. . . . The Judge may thereupon, unless the defendant,
by affidavit, by his own vivo voce evidence, or otherwise, shall
satisfy him that he has a good defense to the action on the
merits, or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to
entitle him to defend, make an order empowering the plaintiff
to enter judgment accordingly." 42
Appearance by the defendant is prerequisite to an application
under Order XIV.
The afflavit. Since the affidavit is practically the sole guar-
anty against perjury by the plaintiff, fairly strict compliance
with rules is demanded. The affidavit must be made by the
plaintiff in person4" or by one with knowledge of the facts.45
Originally in suits by a corporation, the affidavit was thrown
out on the ground that a corporation could not make an affidavit 4"
but later the Rule was relaxed to admit one made by a clerk.41
The affidavit must verify the cause of action on the deponent's
own knowledge and must contain a statement of belief that the
defendant has no defense.48 Order XIV, Rule 2 would seem to
indicate that the affidavit must at least be made at the time of
application for judgment by summons. But Begg v. Cooper,4
which has not been overruled, holds that it may be filed after
the issuance of the summons. Although minor defects in the
42 Order XIV, Rule 1 (a) (in same form as in the Revision of 1893),
ANNuAL PRACTICS (1928) 156; 1 YEARLY PRACTICr (1928) 141.
43 An interesting comparison may be made with the Common Law Pro-
cedure Act of 1852 which provided for default judgment in much the same
casps as in Order III, Rule 6, with the following prerequisites; a)
special indorsement of the writ of summons; b) non-appearance by the
defendant; c) affidavit by the plaintiff of personal service on the de-
fendant.
Order XIV, Rule 1 would seem to be more than the slight extension of
the above which Rosenbaum labels it. ROSENBAUM, RULE-MAKINa Au-
THORITY (1917) 49, n. 16.
44 Frederici v. Vanderzee, 2 C. P. D. 70 (1877).
45 Cf. Lagos v. Grunwaldt, supra note 13 (solicitor may make affidavit
if he shows means of knowledge).
46 Bank of Montreal v. Cameron, 2 Q. B. D. 536 (1877); see dictum per
Brett, L. J., at 539: "As there is no reason why corporations in this
particular case should not be put on the same footing as other plaintiffs,
no doubt the rule will shortly be amended for the purpose." Cf. Shelford
v. L. & E. Ry., 4 Ex. D. 317 (1879); Muirhead v. Cable Co., 27 W. R. 708
(1879) (both to the effect that a corporate defendant may defend by show-
ing defence otherwise than by affidavit).
AT Pathe Cinema v. United Theatres, [1914] 3 K. B. 1253.
4i Symon v. Palmers' Stores, [1912] 1 K. B. 259; Manning v. Moriarty,
I;. R. 12 It. 372 (1883).
V40 L. T. R. 29 (1878).
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plaintiff's affidavit may be cured by reference back to the special
indorsement, ° it may, on the other hand, neither validate -' nor
invalidate -2 the writ. While the cases are in conflict as to
whether the plaintiff may fie an affidavit in reply,-: the better
view is to leave it to the discretion of the trial court. 4 The de-
fendant's affidavit of defense is much more leniently construed
than the plaintiff's affidavit.5 Order XIV, Rule 3 (b) provides
that the affidavit shall state whether the alleged defense goes
to the whole or to a part only, thus serving Order XIV, Rule
4 which provides for partial summary judgments. Where the
defendant's affidavit contains partial admission of the plaintiff's
cause of action, it may be looked to in order to ascertain his
intention as to the apportionment of the sums admitted.- It
is worthy of note that under Order "I-T, Rule 1 (a), the defend-
ant may avail himself of viva voce evidence or other means of
showing a defense than by affidavit; and under Rule 3 (c) the
judge may order the defendant to attend and be examined on
oath or to produce any documents. This procedure is used only
in case of necessity, amounting as it does, to a trial on sum-
mons.G
7
Againskt who final judg'ment nay be signed. Principles of
substantive law are conclusive in determining against whom
Order XIV is available. For instance, final judgment has been
wOlurphy v. Nolan, L. R. IS Ir. 469 (1886) (particulars of indebted-
ness); May v. Chidley, [1894] 1 Q. B. 451 (allegation of notice of dis-
honor in action on check)..
1 Gold Ores Reduction Co. v. Parr, sutpra note 37.
'2 See Southport Tramways Co. v. Gandy, 60 L. J. Q. B. 532, 533 (1807).
53 Cf. North Cent. Waggon Co. v. Wales Waggon Co., 39 L. T. fl. 623
(1879) (no affidavit in reply) with Girvin v. Crepe, 13 Ch. D. 174 (1S79)
(allowing it). Where the plaintiff's affidavit was found to be defective,
a supplemental affidavit was not allowed. Imperial Tobacco Co. v. M c-
Allister, 50 Ir. L. T. 156 (1916).
-Davis v. Spence, 1 C. P. D. 719 (1876) ; Rotheram v. Priest, 41 L. T.
R. 558 (18SO).
r5 Compare with the Ontario practice, infra pp. 437, 433. Mere suggez-
tion of a defense on reasonable grounds has been considered sufficient. See
Harrison v. Bottenheim, 26 W. R. 362, 363 (187) (hearsay admissible
for this purpose). For cases as to sufficiency of defense, see iefm note3
73-75.
Failure of the defendant to file an affidavit is fatal. Cf. Pilkington v.
Power, [1910] 2 Ir. R. 194 (where defendant does not file an affidavit of
defense because of attempt to compromise, he cannot rely on surprise to
set aside an order for final judgment); see Bradley v. Chamberlyn, [1893]
1 Q. B. 439, 442 (where defendant relies on legal technicalities, he may not
later file affidavits).
s Parker v. Guinness, 27 T. L. R. 129 (1910).
wSee Millard v. Baddeley, [1884] W. N. 96, 96.
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refused against a married woman, as such." But, under the
Married Woman's Property Acts, a judgment may be taken
against her personal property. 9 Consequently, the courts are
careful in the wording of these orders. It has been held that'
a judgment may be taken against an administratrix to be levied
on the deceased's effects quando occiderint; 1;0 or against a cor-'
poration; 61 or a partnership even though one of the members
of the firm be an infant.6 2 Under Order XIV, Rule 5, if one of
several defendants presents a good defense and another does
not, an order will be given against the latter while the former
will be allowed to defend.0 3 It is of very great interest to note
the handling of a case where one co-surety, being sued alone,
seeks to bring in the other. This has been denied as prejudicial
to the plaintiff's rights.0 4 With the joinder machinery provided
by the "third party notice" provision, 5 however, it is uncertain
how the question would be settled today.I
Time for application for summary judgment. It is well settled
that once the plaintiff takes steps to try the action by jury, after
the defendant has appeared, it is too late to move for leave to
sign final judgment.Y There is doubt whether the plaintiff can
apply for leave to sign final judgment after a defense has been
filed."" And where final judgment has been irregularly signed,
58 Durrant v. Ricketts, 8 Q. B. D. 177 (1881); Ortner v. Fitzgibbon,
50 L. J. Ch. 17 (1880).
59 Bursill v. Tanner, 13 Q. B. D. 691 (1884); of. Downe v. Fletcher, 21
Q. B. D. 11 '(1888) (plaintiff need not prove existence of separate estate
to recover for debt contracted for before coverture); Bird v. Barstow,
[1892] 1 Q. B. 94 (where a married woman defendant has paid money into
court as a condition of leave to defend, the plaintiff is entitled to it forth-
with, without inquiry whether she had separate estate at the date of
judgment).
GOFindlater v. Tuohy, L. R. 16 Ir. 474 (1885).
61 Shelford v. Ry.; Muirhead v. Cable Co., both supra note 46.
62 Harris v. Beauchamp, [1893] 2 Q. B. 534 (infant's personal property
being protected).
63 Weall v. James, 68 L. T. R. 515 (1893); of. Duffner v. Bowyor, 40
T. L. B. 700 (1924) (plaintiff allowed to continue against second defendant
even though he had agreed to relieve the latter from his duty upon signing
judgment against the first).
64 Caldwell v. Wren, supra note 24; Theme v. Seel, [1878] W. N. 215
(indemnitor).
65 Order XVI, Rule 52.
66 Cf. Gloucestershire Banking Co. v. Phillipps, 12 Q. B. D. 533 (1884)
(upholding summary judgment against a third party joined); 1 Y nARLY
PRAcTIcE (1928) 141.
67 Stewartstown Loan Co. v. Daly, L. R. 12 Ir. 418 (1884); of. Hackett
v. Lalor, L. R. 12 Ir. 44 (1883), (after issue was raised).
60 Cf. McLardy v. Slateum, 24 Q. B. D. 504 (1890) (allowed after de-
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the defendant is entitled to have the judgment and the execution
set aside.69
Partial sumimry judgment. "If it appears that the defence
set up by the defendant applies only to a part of the plaintiff's
claim." '1 In one instance where an amount was admitted sub-
shall have judgment forthwitl for such part of his claim as the
defence does not apply to or as is admitted, subject to such
terms . . as the Judge may think fit; and the defendant
may be allowed to defend as to the residue of the plaintiff's
claim." 7o In one instance where an amount was admitted sub-
ject to a counterclaim for a much larger sum, judgment was re-
fused.71 The imposition of terms at the Judge's discretion would
seem effectively to safeguard the rights of the honest defendant.
Leave to defemg. 'Leave to defend may be given uncondition-
ally, or subject to such terms as to giving security or time or
mode of trial or otherwise as the Judge may think fit." -- Such
leave is given where the defendant shows a defense entitling
him to a trial.73 Such a situation arises where a conflict in the
fense was filed) with Annaly v. Comyn, L. R. 30 Ir. 102 (1892) (too late
after defense); Sligo By. v. Palmer, L. R. 24 Ir. 5S (1SSS) (too late after
statement of claim and defense were filed).
69 Hughes v. Justin, [18941 1 Q. B. 667; cf. Anlaby v. Praetorius, mipma
note 29 (premature entry of judgment).
7O Order XIV, Rule 4. For application of the rule, of. Dennis v. Seymour,
4 Ex. D. 80 (1879); Lazarus v. Smith, [1908] 2 K. B. 200. Clearly, where
the plaintiff admits a partial defense set up, only partial summary judg-
ment will be granted in his favor. Rye v. Hawlkes, L. R. 10 Ir. 12 (1835).
n Court v. Sheen, 7 T. L. R. 556 (1891).
72 Order XIV, Rule 6.
73 The following are representative cases showing various defenses which
were upheld:
a. In contract actions: Warner v. Bowlby, 9 T. L. R. 13 (1892) (pay-
ment to assignor in action by assignee of claim); Ford v. Harvey, 9 T.
L. B. 328 (1893) (breach of covenants not to compete in suit for balance
due on sale of law practice); Thompson v. Marshall, 41 L. T. R. 720 (1879)
(denial of liability as a partner).
b. In action on gnaranty: Lloyd's Banking Co. v. ogle, supr note 24
(no knowledge of details of claim).
c. Actions for payments due on shares of stock: Truffault Co. v. Saun-
ders, 14 T. L. R. 40 (1897) (fraud in the prospectus); Ironclad Mining
Co. v. Gardner, 4 T. L. R. 18 (1887) (agreement with promoter as to
restriction of defendants' liability); Lindsay v. Martin, 5 T. L. R. 322
(1889); Groom v. Rathbone, 41 L. T. R. 591 (1879) (set-off for director's
fees); Wing v. Thurlow, 10 T. L. R. 53 (1893) (misrepresentation).
d. Landlord and tenant: Crawford v. Gillmor, L. B. 30 Ir. 238 (1891)
(estoppel by judgment and in pais).
e. Actions on bills and notes: Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co., 85 L. T.
B. 262 (1901) (misrepresentation); Anonymous, [1S76] W. N. 64 (denial
of consideration); Fuller v. Alexander, 52 L. J. Q. B. 103 (1882) (fraud
in partner's acceptance).
f. Actions on judgment: Codd v. Delap, 92 L. T. R. 510 (1905) (fraud);
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affidavits raises an issue of fact 74 or a difficult question of law,"
or where the defendant brings the case within the prohibitions
of a salutary law.76
Counterclaims. As to the disposal of counterclaims and set-
offs, Sheprard v. Wilkinson 17 suggests three courses: (1) if the
counterclaim be less in amount than the claim, judgment may be
signed by the plaintiff for the difference; (2) if more, the de-
fendant should have leave to defend; (3) if without basis, there
should be judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of his
claim. The court in that case ordered that the execution of
the j'udgment be stayed until trial of the counterclaim. Where
the counterclaim is not closely connected with the cause of
action, it will not ordinarily be considered.71 Again, the best
solution would leave the matter in the discretion of the trial
judge7 9
Terms. Where the defense is not very clear, it may not be
set up unless supported by payment into court or a deposit for
security.80 But once the defense is established, the defendant
is entitled to his money back.8' On the other hand, if it fails, the
Manger v. Cash, 5 T. L. R. 271 (1889) semble; of. Bellow v. Markey, L.
R. 4 Ir. 747 (1878) (defense of-statute of limitations as to part of claim
held to bar summary judgment).
74Bickers v. Speight, supra note 30; Lynde v. Waithman, supra note
19; Jones v. Stone, 70 L. T. R. 174 (1894) (issue as to fact of estoppel) ;
cf. Saw v. Hakim, 5 T. L. R. 72 (1888) (where the affidavits so conflict
that there would seem to be perjury on the part of one of the parties);
see also cases cited supra note 73.
75 Electric & General Contract Corp. v. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co,,
10 T. L. R. 103 (1893); Western Nat. Bank v. Perez Triana Co., 6 T.
L. R. 366 (1890).
76 Woodall v. Cresswell, 9 T. L. R. 619 (1893) (stock transactions
brought within the Gaming Act); Wells v. Allott; Dott v. Bonnard, both
supra note 10.
776 T. L. R. 13 (1889).
78 Rotheram v. Priest, supra note 54 (separate trial for the counter-
claim); Hoby v. Birch, 62 L. T. R. 404 (1890) (in action by the liquidator
for money due the company, the defendant may not set off debt against
the company); Newman v. Lever, 4 T. L. R. 91 (1887) (counterclaim
for damages not allowed in suit on note).
79 Cf. Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells, 38 L. T. R. 197 (1878).
sOHongkong & Shanghai Banking Co. v. Java Agency, 8 T. L. R. 58
(1891); Gerrard v. Clowes, [1892] 2 Q. B. 11; Ray v. Barker, 4 Ex.
D. 279 (1879).; cf. Carta Para Mining Co. v. Fastnedge, 30 W. R. 880
(1882) (where, even though the defendant showed no good defense, since
he urged the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's agent on a material
question, he was allowed to defend on payment into court).
st Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson, 4 C. P. D. 213 (1879). But of.
In re Ford, [1900] 2 Q. B. 211 (money to remain in court to abide the
event).
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plaintiff is entitled to the money without further inquiry2 A
mere deposit by the defendant of the sum claimed does not en-
title him, of right, to defend.33 A decision as to the sufficiency
of security is not appealable; the matter is in the discretion of
the trial judge5 4
A denial of summary judgment because of a technical objec-
tion has been held not to be res adjudicata to a subsequent ap-
plication.ss The order, if given, is interlocutory, and not until
judgment is signed, is it considered final.r Where the recovery
is for a debt and costs, the plaintiff may levy two separate execu-
tions under Order XLII, Rule 18.U If complicated accounts
are involved, the proceedings may be stayed until account is
taken.33 It is of interest to note the power given the judge to
direct the future conduct of the litigation, and the limitations
which have developed thereupon.1 Rule 9 provides that the
imposition of costs shall be dealt with by the judge.
The English rules seemed to have well served the purposes
for which they were designed. Naturally enough, they have
developed furthest as efficient debt collectorsY Their effect on
English procedure can best be shown by the court statistics of
recent years when the press of litigation has well brought out
the efficacy of the RulesY' Their influence on American pro-
cedare, particularly in New Jersey and New York, has been
marked.
82 Bird v. Barstow, supra note 59.
83 Crump v. Cavendish, 5 Ex. D. 211 (18SO).
"Hoare v. Morshead, [1903] 2 K. B. 359.
sr Dombey v. Playfair, [1897] 1 Q. B. 368.
86 Cf. Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, 3 C. P. D. 67 (1S77) ; In re
a debtor, [1903] W. N. 6 (when signed, judgment is final for purpoze of
bankruptcy proceedings); In re Gurney, [1896] 2 Ch. 863 (a summary
judgment creditor obtains no priority until judgment is actually signed).
- Harris v. Jewell, [1883] W. N. 216.
ss Wallingford v. Mutual Society, 5 App. Cas. 685 (1880).
s9 Rule 8 (a) (b) ; of. Langton v. Roberts, 10 T. L. R. 492 (1893) (where
the court was not allowed to restrict defense to a specific question) with
Bolton v. Thorne-George, (1894) 38 SoL. J. 683 (where it was considered
proper for the court to strike two defenses and order a third to be put on
the short cause list). Where "no jury trial" is not made an expre-s
condition of leave to defend, the defendant is entitled to jury trial as under
the general procedure. Macartney v. Macartney, 25 T. L. R. 818 (1909);
Wolfe v. De Braam, 81 L. T. R. 533 (1898).
oo See Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Proccdurc (1926) 9 J. ArM.
Jun. Soc. 164, 165.
91 Thus, in the King's Bench Division there were, in 1923, 6773 summary
judgments as compared with 1546 judgments after trial; in 1924, 5635
as against 1255; in 1925, 5181 as against 1406; in 1926, 4718 as against
1279. See CIVM JUDICIAL STATISTICS (1924) 16; CiviW JUDICLL STATISTIC3
(1925) 16; CrVM JUDICIAL STATISTICS (1926) 16, with tables indicating
the extent of the use of the rules; see also Sunderland, op. cit. upra note
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ONTARIO
The Ontario practice as to summary judgment is borrowed
from England.0 2 Since the rules governing its pronouncement
differ only slightly, differences rather than similarities will here
be indicated.
THE SPECIAL INDORSEMENT
Rule 33 93 provides that:
"... . the writ of summons may, at the option of the plaintiff,
be specially indorsed with a statement of his claim, where the
plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money
(with or without interest, and whether the interest be payable
by way of damages or otherwise) ,4 arising
(a) Upon a contract, express or implied (as for instance on
a bill of exchange, promissory note, check, or other simple con-
tract debt) ; 9' or
(b) On a bond or contract under seal for the payment of a
liquidated sum; 16 or on a judgment; 07 or
(c) On a statute where the amount sought to be recovered is
a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a
penalty; or
(d) On a guaranty, whether under seal or not, where the
claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated
demand; or
(e) On a trust,0 8 and also
90, at 166, pointing out that trial dockets of the King's Bench Division
were relieved of eighty per cent of the cases which would otherwise have
demanded formal trial.
92 See AI. JuD. Soc. BULL., supra note 1, at 101. The Ontario Rules, in
their original form, were compiled shortly after the adoption of the Eng-
lish Schedule of 1875. Revisions were made in 1893 and 1913.
93 RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1928) 10, 16. The Rules are to
be found annotated in HOLMESTEAD, ONTARIO JUDICATURE ACT (4th ed. 1915)
369-377, 400-414.
94 This provision is unique as part of the Rules proper. A similar pro-
vision was made in England in the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 by dc-
fining interest and protest charges as liquidated sums. Supra note 9.
95 Identical with English Order III, Rule 6 (a); cf. Clarkson v. Dwan,
17 P. R.- 92 (Ont. 1896) (writ indorsed for goods sold and delivered,
promissory notes with interest and notarials); McIntyre v. Munn, 6
Ont. L. R. 290 (1903) (action for recovery of advances made under a
contract).
06 Same as Order III, Rule 6 (b); of. Davidson v. Gurd, 15 P. R. 31
(Ont. 1892),
971Robertson v. Robertson, 6 Ont. L. R. 170 (1908) (claim for arrears
of alimony under foreign judgment); cf. Solmes v. Stafford, 16 P. R. 78
(Ont. 1893), aff'd and modified, 16 P. R. 264 (1894). This also has no
counterpart in England where, however, summary judgment in actions on
judgments is given without such express sanction.
98 (c) (d) and (e) are identical with the English Order III, Rule 6
(C) (d) and (e).
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(f) In actions for the recovery of land (with or without a
claim for rent or mesne profits) ; 11
(g) In actions for the recovery of chattels; 110 and
(h) In actions for foreclosure or sale." 10'
The rules of construction are the same as in England 2C2 ex-
cept, of course, where the statute expressly differs. The same
difficulties as to special indorsement of claims for interest in
addition to the liquidated demand arose in the early history of
the Rules as in England, but under the present wording of the
act this is no longer an issue.103 The practice as to amendment
also follows the English practice. 0'°
PROCEDURAL MACHIIIERY
The affidavit. A salient difference from the English practice
is here manifested in the absence of a requirement that the plain-
tiff file an affidavit.V l u Only the defendant is required to present
one when he appears; if he does not comply, the plaintiff
is entitled to default judgment. 10 r Upon its being filed, the
s This shows a radical difference from the parallel English provizion
(Order II, Rule 6 (f)) in that here there is no restriction to actions be-
tween landlord and tenant. Under this section, a claim against an over-
holding tenant for damages equal to double the yearly rcntal value of
the premises may not be specially indorsed since the damages are not
liquidated under a statute. Mvagann v. Ferguson, 29 Ont. 235 (1899); cf.
Central Trust Co. v. Steel Co., 6 Ont. L. R. 464 (1903); Spears v. Flem-
ing, 19 P. R. 127 (Ont. 1900) (unpaid vendor suing for possession of the
land).
12o0 This provision first appeared in Consol. Rule 138 in 1S97.
101 First adopted in the Revision of 1913; (g) and (h) are outstanding;
they appear under no other Rules in any jurisdiction until the very recent
adoption of the summary judgment in Connecticut. See -zpra note 92.
102 This follows naturally from the judicial history of Ontario. In-
deed, English cases are very generally cited in the Ontario cases.
103 Cf. Solmes v. Stafford, -upra note 97 (unliquidated interest on a
judgment); Casselman v. Barrie, 16 P. R. 507 (Ont. 1S92) (interest on a
money claim); Baldwin v. Quinn, 16 P. R. 248 (Ont. 1S94) (interest on
claim for arrears of rent); Clarkson v. Dwan, supra note 95 (exceszive in-
terest claim where no special contract to pay it was alleged). Under
Order 52 (2) the interest claim is allowed.
1-4 Amendment is specifically provided for in Order 57 (3). See HoL=I-
sTnAD, op. cit. supra note 93, at 376-377; cf. Davidson v. Gurd, apr7a note
96, with Nesbitt v. Armstrong, 14 P. R. 366 (Ont. 1892).
105 Consol. Rule 603 of 1S97 had provided for the same procedure as
now used in England under Order XIV, Rule 1, making an affidavit by
the plaintiff an absolute condition to the granting of an application for
summary judgment. See Munro v. Pike, 15 P. R. 164, 164 (Ont. 1893);
Clarkson v. Dwan, supra note 95, at 95. But, as amended in Rule 57
(1), only the defendant need file an affidavit.
1o Rule 56 (1) (2); cf. MeVicar v. McLaughlin, 16 P. R. 450 (Ont
1895) (non-appearance by the defendant held to be admission of the cor-
rectness of the claim).
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plaintiff may cross-examine as to its contents and move for
judgment which will be granted if the court is not satisfied
that the defendant has a good defense to the action on its
merits. O-
Practice. The motion may be made as to a cause of action
specially indorsed, though the writ may also contain a claim of a
different nature.108 Amendment of the writ may be made on
motion, judgment being awarded in accordance with the writ
as amended.09 Partial summary judgments, 110 conditional "I
and unconditional 112 leave to defend are granted or withheld in
the same manner as in England. Judgment may be awarded and
execution issued against any defendant without prejudice to the
plaintiff's right to proceed against any other defendant."" Ref-
erence may be directed when the only issue is as to the amount
recoverable 4 and any inquiries may be made at any stage of
the proceedings. 1 5 Further variation from the English proce-
dure may be noted in the practice of allowing notice of motion
for judgment, by leave; where a special reason for urgency is
shown, such leave may be given ex parte, subject to such direc-
tions as to notice and affidavit as may seem just.1 0 Also, in
actions of account, it is specially provided that, in the event of
I" Rule 57 (1); cf. Stephenson v. Dallas, 13 P. R. 450 (Ont, 1890)
(where both parties cross-examined on the affidavits).
108 Rule 57 (2).
109 Rule 57 (3).
110 Rule 58; see HOLMESTEAD, op. cit. supra note 93, at 408-409.
"'1Rule 60; Stephenson v. Dallas, dupra note 107 (where there is no
distinct defense offered, defendant may defend only on terms) ; Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Ontario Coal Co., 16 P. R. 87 (Ont. 1894) scmblo; see
HOLAMSTEAD, op. cit. supra note 93, at 407-408. This Rule places terms in
the discretion of the trial judge who may direct a speedy trial.
152 Rule 60. Where an arguable question appears, or a reasonable de-
fense is shown, the defendant is allowed to defend unconditionally. Castle
Co. v. Kouri, 18 Ont. L. R. 462 (1909); Can. Electric Co. v. Water &
Light Co., 16 Ont. L. R. 641 (1903); Davey v. Sadler, 1 Ont. L. R. 626
(1901); Wilkes v. Kennedy, 16 P. R. 204 (Ont. 1894); cf. Leslie v. Poul-
ton, 15 P. R. 332. (Ont. 1893) (where, although no clear defense was
shown, other circumstances impelled the court to order a trial of the issues).
113 Rule 59. But cf. Hoffam v. Crerar, 18 P. R. 473 (Ont. 1899) (where
settlement with a number of joint contractors out of court was held to bar
summary judgment against the other contractors). It is worthy of note
that the same restrictions obtain in Ontario as do in England as to the
wording of summary judgments given against married women. Re Hamil-
ton v. Perry, 24 Ont. L. R. 38 (1911); Cameron v. Heighs, 14 P. R. 56
(Ont. 1890); Kinnear v. Blue, 10 P. R. 465 (Ont. 1885); Quebec Bank v.
Radford, 10 P. R. 619 (Ont. 1885); Cameron v. Rutherford, 10 P. R. 620
(Ont. 1885).
4Rule 61. Compare with this the denial of motions in England when




non-appearance by the defendant, the plaintiff may apply for
the taking of the account claimed; if appearance is entered, the
plaintiff may move for judgment without pleading, and unless
a preliminary question arises, judgment will be pronounced.7
An early Ontario case 11 has an interesting dictum to the
same effect as many later English dicta: namely, that the sum-
mary judgment should be only sparingly granted; that indeed,
it is to be withheld unless the plaintiff will be seriously preju-
diced. This would seem quite at variance with the policy as
represented in the Ontario Rules as they now stand-a policy
which favors the granting of the summary judgment.
To the American student of procedure, the Canadian experi-
ence with the summary judgment is especially valuable. While
the objection may be made to an English practice that it was
developed under conditions radically different from ours, this
argument is not applicable to the Canadian rule developed under
economic and legal conditions very similar to our own.
OTHER BRITISH COLONIES
The summary judgment is quite usually found in the British
Colonial practice system. In the Canadian provinces of New
Brunswick,-13 Nova Scotia,2' British Columbia,'-" Saskatche-
wan,'12 Manitoba 13 and Alberta, = * appear summary judgment
provisions closely similar to the English but without the addi-
tional features of the Ontario procedure. In Quebec, the Code
of Civil Procedure -5 provides for a speedy judgment in a care-
227 Rules 63, 64.
318 See Barber v. Russell, 9 P. R. 433, 442 (Ont. 1882).
3-l Order III, Rules 6, 14, THE JUDICATURE ACT AND RLES oF CounT
(N. B. 1927) 37, 54; cf. Balmain v. Neil, 11 D. L. R. 294 (1912) (action
for goods sold and delivered).
o20 Order III, Rules 5, 6; Order XIV, NovA SCOTIA JUDiCATUTnE Acr (1920)
27, 45.I-" Order XIV, BnrrISH COLUMBLA SUPREME CouRT RULis; cf. Lemblze
v. Chin Wing, 4 D. L. R. 431 (1912); Bank of Ottawa v. Adler, 6 D. L.
R. 410 (1912).
122 Order IX, RuiEs OF COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN (1921) 27; cf. Foster
v. Dlugos, 10 Sash. L. R. 361 (1917) (under Rule 135) ; Weyburn v. Secur-
ity Bank, 22 D. L. R. 689 (1915).
123 Cf. Court of Queen's Bench Act, 58 & 59 Vxcr. Muron,. c. 6, §
278 (d) (1895); I MAN 0BA Rnv. STAT. (1913) c. 46, §§ 300 (d), G09; see
Morris v. London Loan Co., 19 Can. Sup. Ct. 434, 438 (1891).
3.24 Rule 275 et seq., ALBERTA RULES oF COURT (19141) 40; cf. Elgin City
Banking Co. v. Mawhinney, 16 D. L. R. 74 (1914); Scandinavian Nat. Bank
v. Shuman, 37 D. L. R. 419 (1917) (citing English precedents).
22r CURRAN, CODE OF CIVm PRocE~uRn (1922) c. 50; cf. Davis v. Chau-
vette, 27 Que. P. R. 207 (1924); Riddell v. Vipond, 27 Que. P. ML 0.03 (1924).
This provision would seem to be based on the French summary civil procc-
dure which is fully treated in ENGEL=ANN-DMILLA, HIsTORY or Co:iTnmci.-
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fully enumerated list of cases, with no identity with the English
practice. While the Australian summary judgment is modeled
on the English rule, the South African practice shows many local
characteristics.?' The summary judgment seems to have found
its way into the various corners of the British Empire shortly
after the adoption by the home country of the Rules of 1873.
CONNECTICUT
On November 12, 1928, the judges of the Superior Court of
Connecticut adopted an extensive summary judgment rule to be
effective on February 1, 1929. The rule is interesting both in
the manner of its adoption and in its content. It was recom-
mended to the judges by the recently created Judicial Council
of Connecticut after a very careful and extensive investigation
of the subject227 Its inauguration by the judges rather than by
the legislature is an example of the use which can be made of
rule-making power in the courts.
The actions in which such judgments may be sought are set
forth in the rule as follows:
"All actions to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money,
with or without interest, arising:
(a) On a negotiable instrument, a contract under seal or a
recognizance; or
(b) Any other contract, express or implied excepting quasi
contracts; or
(c) On a judgment for a stated sum; or
(d) On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is
a fixed sum or in the nature of a debt; or
(e) On a guaranty, whether under seal or not, when the
claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated
demand only; and in all other actions
(f) For the recovery of specific chattels, with or without a
claim for withholding the same provided that if such claim
be for other than nominal damages and be unliquidated it may
be severed and proceeded with as provided inparagraph two.
(g) To quiet and settle the title to real estate or any inter-
est therein; or
TAL CiviL PROCEUPE (1927) 745-7, 768-9; cf. DE BEcKE, THE CODE OF
CrVM PROCEDURE OF JAPAN (1928) 86.
328 Cf. Bayne v. Blake, 9 Comm. L. Rep. 366 (Australia 1909), decided
under Rules of Supreme Court (1906) Order XIV (a), n. 1; BucKLE
AND JONES, THE CIVIL PRACTICE OF THE MAGISTRATES' CouRTs IN So. AFRICA
(2d ed. 1924) 294.
227 The rule is set forth in full and discussed in Clark, The New Summary
Judgment Rule, to appear in the February issue of (1929) 3 CoNX. B. J.;
see also Clark, The New Summary Judgment Rule in Conneeticut (1929)
15 A. B. A. J. 82.
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(h) To enforce or foreclose a lien or mortgage; or
(i) To discharge any claimed invalid mortgage, lien or
caveat or lis pendens; ..." '3
This rule would seem, in some respects, to be even broader
than the Ontario Rule, heretofore the most extensive.1
As to the practice machinery, the section 14 (1) provides that:
".... final judgment shall be entered by the Court at any
time after the defendant has appeared, either before or after
an answer has been filed, upon written motion and affidavit of
the plaintiff or of any person having personal knowledge of the
facts verifying the cause of action, and the amount he believes to
be due and his belief that there is no defense to the action, unless
the defendant, within ten days after the filing, in duplicate, of
such motion and affidavit or within such further time as the
Court for good cause shown may prescribe, shall show by affi-
davit such facts as may be deemed by the Court sufficient to
entitle him to defend."
Later paragraphs provide for partial summary judgments; for
application of the rules to counterclaims and to all pending ac-
tions; for the use, in foreclosure actions, of the alternative rem-
edy of a motion to disclose defense; and for affidavit by corporate
officer in actions by or against a corporation.' =
An interesting provision appears in the Connecticut rule
(paragraph 3) to the effect that, if the court is of the opinion
from the affidavits that:
".... the only question or questions arising are bona fide ques-
tions of law, it shall fie its finding so stating and that defendant
has no defense on the facts, and thereafter the defendant shall,
if he so desires, fie within ten days a pleading appropriate to
test such question or questions of law."
In default of such pleading or if the defendant
"... fails to prevail thereon, final judgments, as of course,
shall be entered by the Court for the plaintiff."
This settles a problem of some dispute in other jurisdictions,
whether questions of law may be raised upon the motion for sum-
mary judgment; it further provides a machinery for testing such
question. On the whole this plan seems practical, subject to a
possible question whether the machinery is not too cumbersome
and whether the court should not decide the matter on the ali-
davits without further pleading.
It will be of great interest to note the construction and devel-
opment of the rule after it has been in effect for a few years.
The history of its adoption along with the favorable judicial
attitude toward the rule augurs well for its future.
82 CoNN. RuLEs or CIVm Paoicnr § 14 A (1).
19 Compare with the Ontario rules, mpra pp. 436, 437.




The adoption in New Jersey of a new practice act in 1912
served as the occasion for the introduction into that state of the
summary judgment procedure.13, Like the rest of the act, the
Rule was modeled upon the English provision but covered a much
more restricted field of cases.132 It was made to rest upon the
foundation of the old common-law power of the judges to strike
sham or frivolous answers.1,33 The New Jersey courts have
relied on this power as a basis for upholding the procedure
against the claim that it was unconstitutional in depriving the
defendant of his right to a jury trial.1 34
Rule 57 provides:
"When an answer is filed in action to recover a debt or liqui-
dated demand arising:
a. Upon a contract express or implied, sealed or not
sealed; vs or
13, Provision was made both in statute and rules of court. N. J. Laws
1912, 380; 2 N. J. ComxP. STAT. (Supp. 1915) §§ 291, 292; Rules 57-60, N. 3.
Laws 1912, 394-395; SHEEN, NEw JERSEY PRACTiCE AcT (1916) 239-241.
132 Cf. English Order III, Rule 6 and Order XIV.
's3 The statute, §§ 15, 16, provides:
"Subject to rules, any frivolous or sham defenses to the whole or
any part of the complaint may be struck out; or, if it appear probable
that the defense is frivolous or sham, defendant may be allowed to
defend on terms. Defendant, after final judgment, may appeal from
any order made against him under this section.
If the answer as filed, or after any part thereof shall be struck out,
leaves p part of the plaintiff's claim uncontested, judgment interlocu-
tory or final may be entered for such part as is not contested, and the
cause may proceed to trial as to the residue."
The following cases have been decided under these provisions apart from
the Rules: Milberg v. Keuthe, 98 N. J. L. 779, 121 Atl. 713 (1923) (eject-
ment) ; Lamer v. Montclair, 99 N. J. L. 510, 123 Atl. 886 (1924) (damages
for wrongful dismissal). ,
13 4 Wittemann v. Giele, 99 N. J. L. 478, 123 Atl. 716 (1924); see Eisele
v. Raphael, 90 N. J. L. 219, 223, 101 AtI. 200, 202 (1917); of. Coykendall
v. Robinson, 39 N. J. L. 98, 99 (1876) (on the common-law power).
'a5 Cf. Perloff v. Island Dev. Co., 133 At]. 178 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1926)
(action on implied contract for money back); Lembeck Brewing Co. v.
Krause, 94 N. J. L. 219, 109 Atl. 293 (1920) (action on covenant in mort-
gage allowed even though note was barred by the statute of limitations);
Eisele v. Raphael, supra note 134 (balance due on account in "margin"
stock transaction); Boynton Lumber Co. v. Evans, 101 N. J. L. 120, 128
At]. 180 (1925) (suit on mechanic's lien based on statutory right); Mer-
chants' Bank v. Roosma, 2 Misc. 690 (N. J. 1924) (action on note); Conk-
lin v. Genung, 92 N. J. L. 618, 108 Atl. 366 (1919) (claim for deficiency
after foreclosure of bonds) ; Dananhower v. Birch, 97 N. J. L. 193, 116 At].
786 (1920) (assessments levied against stockholders in judicial proceed-
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b. Upon a judgment for a stated sum; or
c. Upon a statute; 13,
the answer may be struck and judgment final may be entered
upon motion and affidavit as hereinafter provided,13 unless the
defendant by affidavit or other proof shall show such facts as
may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to
entitle him to defend." "3s
Other provisions closely follow the English model: namely,
in specifying the nature of the plaintiffs affidavit; -3 in pro-
viding for judgment for only a part of the claim where there is
a defense to the remainder; '0 and for leave to defend uncondi-
tionally or upon terms.' , ' No summary judgment may be entered
except by virtue of an order of the court or a justice at cham-
bers.1- The application for such judgment may be made on
ex parte affidavits. Four days' notice is specified unless the court
or justice, for special reasons, shall order shorter notice.145
The practice under these Rules has not been complicated, ques-
tions having arisen on only a few details. The statute itself
settled a former controversy by providing that an appeal may be
ings); Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. W. & H. R. R., 98 N. J. L. 507, 120 At]. 704
(1923) (interest due on bonds); Birdsall v. Gardella, 129 Atl. 817 (N. J.
Sup. Ct. 1925) (bail recognizance).
V;6 Emburgh v. Board of Freeholders, 87 N. J. L. 6037, 94 Atl. 586 (1915)
(action under statute allowing recovery of salary-pro rata-and election
expenses by member of deposed county board); McDonnell v. Du Closs,
2 Misc. 86 (N. J. 1924); of. Bolton v. Bolton, 8 N. J. L. 69, 89 At]. 1014
(1914) (arrears of alimony may be basis of summary judgment even
though the decree is not a judgment in the sense of being entitled to full
"faith and credit;" at court's discretion).
'a" This is the practice when sham of frivolous defenses are interpoZed.
Conklin v. Genung, supra note 135 (defense of usury and discharge of
sureties by extension held sham in action for deficiency judgment) ; Danan-
hower v. Birch, gzpra note 135. Or where the defendant fails to show
facts entitling him to defend. McDonnell v. Du Closs, cstpra note 1",6.
If a counterclaim is without merit, that too is stricken out. Madison Trust
Co. v. Swenson, 2 Misc. 83 (N. J. 1924); cf. Eisele v. Raphael, -Zspra
note 134.
13s Cf. Perloff v. Island Dev. Co., svpra note 135; Smith v. Hopping, 88
N. J. L. 195, 95 Atl. 993 (1915) (variance between plaintiff's complaint and
affidavit).
V'9 Rule 58; cf. English Order XIV, Rule 1 (a).
1.0 Rule 59; cf. English Order XIV, Rule 4.
141 Rule 60; cf. English Order XIV; Rule 6; cf. Mleyer v. Nickelsburg
Bros. Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 36 (1913) (all defenses but one being striclen, the
defendant was given leave to defend on that one on condition that he give
security against judgment).
-4 Milberg v. Keuthe, s:pra note 133 (Commissioner of Supreme Court
not authorized person).
14 This provision seems to have been added after the original adoption
of the Rules. Cf. SUPREME COuRT RuLEs (1919) No. 84.
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taken from the orders.14  The attitude of the courts in the few
decisions rendered is that the findings of the trial judge as to
the frivolousness or failure of the defenses is deemed conclu-
sive.1' 5 Interest claims have not been such a source of difficulty
in New Jersey as elsewhere. The practice would seem to be
merely to deduct them when erroneously allowed.14
Although in effect for sixteen years, the New Jersey summary
judgment seems not to have been much used. The reason for
this is entirely conjectural. It is quite probable that future
crowded court dockets may invite its more extensive use.
NEW YORK
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Constitutionality. The constitutionality of the summary pro-
cedure has presented a more serious problem in New York than
elsewhere, because of previous New York decisions indicating a
lack of power to strike answers fair in form but false in fact. '
Before the adoption of the code the New York cases had held
that the general issue could not be striken as false and sham, on
the ground that such an action would be an infringement of the
constitutional right to jury trial.'4 s But they did exercise the
power to strike in the case of special pleas which were false and
sham.'4  The Code of Procedure then provided that:
"Sham and irrelevant answers and defenses may be stricken
out on motion and upon such terms as the court may in their
discretion impose." 'so
144 N. J. Laws 1912, 380; see Madison Trust Co. v. Swenson, supra note
137, at 85. The earlier practice was to consider these orders not roviewable.
State Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Williams, 78 N. J. L. 720, 75 At]. 927
(1910) (order striking plea); see Brown v. Ward, 44 N. J. L. 177, 179
(1882) (sham and frivolous pleadings).
15 See Eisele v. Raphael, supra note 134, at 221, 101 Atl. at 202; Witte-
mann v. Giele, supra note 134, at 479, 123 Atl. at 716; of. Larner v. Mont-
clair, supra note 133, at 512, 123 Atl. at 887 (where the defendant does
not present the affidavits and exhibits before the appellate court, the con-
clusion of the trial court will not be disturbed).
146 Cf. Emburgh v. Board of Freeholders, supra note 136 (deducting in-
terest allowed below where it was not provided for in statute under which
the action was brought). As to the question under the English practice,
see supra p. 429.
'47 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 383-384; Rothschild, Simplification
of Civil Practice in New York (1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 618, 646.
14s Wood v. Sutton, 12 Vend. 234 (N. Y. 1834); see Dwan v. Massarene,
199 App. Div. 872, 874, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577, 578 (Ist Dep't 1922).149 Broome County Bank v. Lewis, 18 Wend. 564 (N. Y. 1836); see Dwan
v. Massarene, supra note 148.
'so N. Y. CODE Proc. § 152; later N. Y. CODE Civ. PRoC. § 638 to the effect
that:
"If an answer or reply be sham or frivolous the court may treat the
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At first this was liberally construed, the courts refusing to
limit its application to affirmative pleas. 1 But by 1871 there
was a reversal of sentiment and in Waylc nd v. TyscV - 2 the
court denied a motion to strike a general denial in spite of the
plaintiff's affidavit that the answer was sham.
In the second decade of the twentieth century, with the press
of litigation and the need for relief against dilatory procedural
tactics, criticism of these views developed.- 3 This culminated
in the adoption in 1921, by the Convention on Rules of Civil
Practice, of Rules 118 and 114 which provided for a summary
judgment procedure, especially designed to suppress false and
sham answers in specific classes of civil actions. This provision
did not operate to supplant the ancient power of the judges to
strike pleadings or order judgment thereupon, but existed with
it as a special, speedy remedy in the designated cases. Natu-
rally enough in view of the previous decisions, the constitutional
issue arose immediately upon the formulation of the Rules. It
was, however, soon settled in favor of the validity of the rules,1 ;
and since the first year of their use, no further question has
arisen on this point.
THE RULES
The Rules which went into effect in October 1921 are as fol-
lows:
"Rule 113. Surmnary Jzcdgment.-When an answer is served
in an action to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising,
1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
2. on a judgment for a stated sum;
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on
motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person
having knowledge of the facts, verifying the cause of action and
stating the amount claimed, and his belief that there is no de-
pleading as a nullity and give judgment accordingly, or allow a new plead-
ing to be served upon such terms as the court deems just." Cf. N. Y. C.
P. A. Rule 104.1' People v. McCumber, 18 N. Y. 315 (1S5S).
152 45 N. Y. 281 (1871). This was followed by: Farmers' Nat. Bank v.
Leland, 50 N. Y. 673 (1872) (denial of information and belief) ; Neubcrgur
v. Webb, 24 Hun 347 (N. Y. 1881) semble.
153 See (1923) 1 N. Y. L. REV. 16.
214 Cf Rule 104, supra note 150; Katz v. Weinschelblatt, 209 App. Div.
606, 205 N. Y. Supp. 76 (2d Dep't 1924); see alo N. Y. C. P. A. Rules
106-112 dealing with motions addressed to the pleadings; rfothschild, op. cit.
supra note 147, at 650.
1-55 Dwan v. Massarene, supra note 148; Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div.
504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), affd, 235 N. Y. 531, 139 N. E.
724 (1923); see General Invest. Co. v. I. R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 103, 142,
139 N. E. 216, 219 (1923); (1922) 22 COL. L. llv. 483. The exhaustive
opinion in Hanna v. litchell, svpra, is by Justice Page, Chairman of the
Convention which adopted the rules.
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fense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other
proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge
hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend.
"Rule 114. Partial Judgment.-If it appear that such defense
applies only to part of plaintiff's claim or that any part be ad-
mitted, the plaintiff may have final judgment forthwith for so
much of his claim as such defense does not apply to or as is
admitted, on such terms as may be just, and the action may be
severed."
These sections represent a further adaptation and restriction
of the English Rules in America.yaG The tendency to limit their
application to the clear cases of "debt or liquidated demand" is
evident. Fundamentally, the rules governing the procedure in
the granting of summary judgment, within the limits set, are
the same in New York and in England. What differences do
appear are the result, in some cases, of variant judicial struc-
ture; in others, of historical background.
SCOPE OF RULE 113
Contract. The contract sued upon must give rise to a "debt
or liquidated demand," actions sounding in damages being re-
garded as without the scope of the summary remedy.1 From
the outset the remedy has been most freely used in commercial
cases. Actions on and arising out of negotiable instruments,153
sales,21; banking,160 insurance, 161 and real estate transactions 102
156 Cf. N. J. RULES 57-60; ONT. RuLEs 33, 57-62.
1w See cases infra note 170.
158 For a full discussion of the treatment of such claims, see infra note
195.
1559 Montgomery v. Lans, 194 N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (contract
to sell merchandise for plaintiff on certain date for certain sum); Wilbur-
Dolson Silk Co. v. Wallach Co., 206 App. Div. 470, 201 N. Y. Supp. 465
(1st Dep't 1923) (price of silk thread after time for inspection had
elapsed); Dibble v. Jones, 130 Misc. 359, 223 N. Y. Supp. 785 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (purchase price of seed).
160 Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110 (1926). (resti-
tution of money for establishment of foreign credit); McNamara Trading
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 288 Fed. 985 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) (balance due on
policy deposited with bank as collateral); Conners Car Co. v. Mfrs. Nat.
Bank, 124 Misc. 584, 209 N. Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd without
opinion, 210 N. Y. Supp. 939 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1925) (money paid out
by bank on a forged check).161 Cleghorn v. Ocean Accident Corp., 216 App. Div. 342, 215 N. Y. Supp.
127 (2d Dep't 1926) (suit by insured against indemnitor to recover amount
of judgment paid), aff'd on this point, 244 N. Y. 166, 155 N. E. 87 (1926) ;
Devlin v. Ins. Co., 123 Misc. 784, 206 N. Y. Supp. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1924)
(suit by accident victim for injuries sustained, judgment against Cab Co.
being unsatisfied), modified and aff'd, 213 App. Div. 152, 210 N. Y. Supp. 57
(1st Dep't 1925).
162 Coutts v. Kraft, 119 Misc. 260, 196 N. Y. Supp. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
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have furnished the bulk of the precedents in the new practice.
The indebitatus counts generally will support a motion under
Rule 113 r- as well as, also, the quantum, meruit count.'"  A
distinction has been made between contracts implied in fact and
those implied in law.105 Although this has been subjected to
much criticism,"" it is explicable by the conservative attitude of
the New York courts.
Judgmzent. This seems to be the least used section of the
Rules. Pinney v. Geraghty "77 appears to stand alone as an ad-
judication in this category.
Claims izot within the Rile. A great number and variety of
cases have been held to be without the scope of the Rule. "Claims
involving unliquidated damages lead all others.c3 The courts
af'd, 198 N. Y. Supp. 908 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1923); Stern v. Zeno,
116 Mlisc. 661, 191 N. Y. Supp. 298 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (actions for rent);
Haiss v. Schmukler, 121 Mlisc. 574, 201 N. Y. Supp. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1922);
Isaacs v. Schmuck, 218 App. Div. 516, 218 N. Y. Supp. 56S (2d Dep't 192G),
rev'd, 245 N. Y. 77, 156 N. E. 621 (1927) (recovery of down payments on
land purchase contract); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Smith, 215 App.
Div. 448, 213 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1st Dep't 1926) (action for title examining
fee).
11- See Appelbaum v. Gross, 117 Misc. 140, 147, 191 N. Y. Supp. 710, 714
(Sup. Ct. 1921), ajfd, 200 App. Div. 914, 193 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2d Dep't
1922).164 Cf. Jacobs v. Korpus, 128 Misc. 445, 218 N. Y. Supp. 314 (Sup. Ct.
1926) (for services).
2G5 Cf. Poland Export Co. v. Marcus, 204 App. Div. 002, 198 N. Y. Supp.
5 (1st Dep't 1923) (no summary judgment on promise to pay implied in
law from violation of duty). But cf. Lee v. Graubard, 205 App. Div. 3,4,
199 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1923) (recovery allowed on contract implied
in fact where defendant wrongfully received aldermanic salary); Caszidy
v. Sullivan, 205 App. Div. 347, 199 N. Y. Supp. 56G (1st Dep't 19230);
Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 218 App. Div. 536, 218 N. Y. Supp. 534
(1st Dep't 1926) (recovery by subrogee of sums paid to the insured), rcv'd,
246 N. Y. 162, 158 N. E. 60 (1927); see Comment (1928) 6 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 59, 63-64.
166 Cf. Finch, S.miary Jidgmn2nts vadcr the Civil Practice Act of Nct
Yrl. (1924) 49 A. B. A. REP. 588, 591. But compare the explicit distinction
made in the new Connecticut rules, supra, p. 440.
-67 209 App. Div. 630, 205 N. Y. Supp. 645 (3d Dep't 1924) (suit against
indemnitor on judgment recovered against plaintiff by C); ef. MasZee
Lumber Co. v. Benenson, 23 F. (2d) 107 (D. N. Y. 1927) (allowance of
claim against bankrupt estate not judgment against bankrupt so as to
come within Rule 113).1 5 &Mogul v. Lavine, 247 N. Y. 20, 159 N. E. 708 (1928); Lawrence
Te-xtile Corp. v. Express Co., 125 Misc. 858, 211 N. Y. Supp. 679 (Mun. Ct.
1925); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Barrett, 205 App. Div. 749, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 298 (2d Dep't 1923) (all holding that claims by shipper against
carrier for loss are without Rule 113 because sounding in damages);
Schwed v. Kennedy, 220 App. Div. 189, 221 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1st Dep't
1927) (damages for wrongful discharge); State Realty Co. v. PoA 123
M1isc. 925, 206 N. Y. Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (action against guarantor
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have also refused to apply the Rule in: suit for injunction; I'l
summary proceedings by a landlord; 170 suit for partition; 1
action under statute relating to levy on earnings and income of
judgment debtor; 172 action by bailee of goods on insurance pol-
joy; 3 and claim for recovery of an increased rental paid under
protest.7 4
THE AFFIDAVIT
The affidavit is the universal distinguishing feature of the
summary judgment, furnishing as it does, the necessary guaranty
of trustworthiness of the claim sued upon. It must be made on
the personal knowledge of the affiant,75 should state the elements
of the cause of action,178 and a belief that the defendant has no
defense. The tendency is to compel the plaintiff to bring himself
squarely within the requirements of the Rules. Even though
the answer be defective in form, the affidavit may raise the issue
and show defenses; 177 but mere repetition of the denials in the
answer are ineffective 8 The affidavit must contain "evidential"
not "ultimate" facts, or mere "conclusions of law." 170 An early
of lease for deficiency in rent where contract provided that lessor re-rent
at "best possible price"); Schaffer Stores v. Sweet, 228 N. Y. Supp. 599
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (suit on defendant's agreement to be liable for shortages).
169 103 Park Av. Co. v. Exchange Buffet Co., 203 App. Div. 739, 197
N. Y. Supp. 422 (1st Dep't 1922), 'rew'd on another point, 242 N. Y. 360,
152 N. E. 117 (1926).
170 905 West End Ave. Co. v. Peers, 118 Misc. 754, 195 N. Y. Supp. 86
(1st Dep't 1922).
171 See Lowe v. Plainfield Trust Co., 216 App. Div. 72, 76, 215 N. Y. Supp.
50, 54 (1st Dep't 1926).
172 Royco Realty Co. v. Farlor, 225 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
173 Brooklyn Clothing Corp. v. Fire Ins. Co., 205 App. Div. 743, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 208 (2d Dep't 1923), rev'g 118 Misc. 674, 195 N. Y. Supp. 27 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
1t Hinrichs v. City of New York, 121 Misc. 592, 201 N. Y. Supp. 377
(Sup. Ct. 1923),f a f'd without opinion, 242 N. Y. 527, 152 N. E. 413 (1926).
17 Lonsky v. Bank of U. S., 220 App. Div. 194, 221 N. Y. Supp. 177
(Ist Dep't 1927). ,176 Nemours-Stevens v. Nemours Trading Co., 204 App. Div. 38, 197 N. Y.
Supp. 241 (1st Dep't 1922) (exact allegation of "damages" necessary);
Moe v. Bank of U. S., 211 App. Div. 519, 207 N. Y. Supp. 347 (2d Dep't
1925) (insufficient allegation as to refusal of payment) ; of. Farmers' Nat.
Bank v. Williams, 117 Misc. 567, 192 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1921)
(requirements in action on note stated).
177 Ford v. Reilley, 127 Misc. 373, 216 N. Y. Supp. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
178 O'Meara Co. v. Nat. Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925) ;
cf. Maltz v. Daly,-120 Misc. 466, 198 N. Y. Supp. 690 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
(where the defendant does not file an affidavit, summary judgment will bo
granted).; Hoof v. Hunter Corp., 193 N. Y. Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1922)
(verified answer not enough).
179 Kellog v. Berkshire Bldg. Corp., 125 Misc. 818, 211 N. Y. Supp. 623
(Sup. Ct. 1925); Sher v. Rodkin, 198 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
see (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 548.
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case intimates that one affidavit for each party is enough. ' , The
matter has not, as yet, been conclusively determined. In a1
probability, the courts will tend to limit the number in order to
avoid opportunity for delay.
PROCEDURAL IACHINERY
With the affidavits before it, the function of the court is to
determine whether or not a bona fide issue has been presented
for trial. If none is found, an order is made granting the motion
for summary judgment. On the other hand, if an issue does
appear, it is not within the power of the court to decide it sum-
marily. The defendant is entitled, as a matter of constitutional
right, to a trial under the general procedure. Issue-finding,
rather than issue-determination, is then the key to the procedure.
The defendant must set up a bona fide defense, supported by
affidavits, in order to bar the motion; ',, feigned issues 1,2 are
not sufficient. Failure to present an affidavit of defense is usu-
ally fatal to the defendant's case.18 3 Presentation and proof by
affidavit by the plaintiff of a good cause of action are, however,
conditions to recovery under the Rules.' " Where questions' of
law arise, they may be disposed of without delay.1 53 And where
'so Cf. Twigg v. Twigg, 117 Misc. 154, 191 N. Y. Supp. 731 (Sup. Ct.
1921), aff'd without opinion, 193 N. Y. Supp. 956 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1922).
l 2 Actions on negotiable instruments furnish varied instances of defcnses
which have been held insufficient. Cf. Hongkong Bardng Corp. v. Lazard-
Godchaux Co., 207 App. Div. 174, 201 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1st Dep't 1923)
(in action on draft, resolution by defendant that plaintiffs look to guaran-
tors for payment held admission of liability), arfd without opinion, 239
N. Y. 610, 147 N. E. 216 (1925); Spiegel Realty Co. v. Gotham Nat Bank,
121 Misc. 547, 201 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (in action to recover
amount of forged checks, defense of negligence in discovering forgery held
unrelated to defendant's acceptance), affd 204 N. Y. Supp. 927 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1924); Cogswell v. Cogswell, 130 Misc. 541, 224 N. Y. Supp.
59 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (general denial; no defense in pleadings and affidavit).
Some of these are, obviously, decisions based on the substantive law of
negotiable instruments.
182 Cf. Evalenko v. Catts, 125 Misc. 726, 210 N. Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. CL
1925), affd without opinion, 213 N. Y. Supp. 796 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1926).
1s3 Maltz v. Daly; Hoof v. Hunter Corp., both svpra note 173.
1S Hallgarten v. Wolkenstein, 204 App. Div. 4S7, 19S N. Y. Supp. 485
(1st Dep't 1923) (affidavits did not fully show contract for purchase of
stock); Twigg v. Twigg, supra note 180 (mere assertion of an account
stated is insufficient); Hausw, ald v. Katz, 216 App. Div. 92, 214 N. Y. Supp.
705 (1st Dept 1926) (plaintiff must prove consideration for alleged guar-
anty); see State Bank v. Mackstein, 123 Mise. 416, 205 N. Y. Supp. 291
(Sup. Ct. 1924).
8 a Coutts v. Kraft, szpra note 162; cf. Rotenbach v. Young, 119 Mise.
267, 196 N. Y. Supp. 220 (Sup. Ct 1922), aff'd "ithout opinion, 200 N. Y.
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counterclaims are interposed, they are handled in the same man-
ner as any other part of the answer.'8 0
The determination of what is and what is not a bona fide
defense presents the greatest problem in the application of Rule
113. Each case must be considered on its own particular facts,
and generalizations are of comparatively little assistance to the
trial judge in disposing of the individual case. Inability to bring
the specific facts within the confines of the statute leads neces-
sarily to a denial of the plaintiff's motion, situations of doubt
being resolved in the defendant's favor. When the answer sets
up a denial of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief, its treatment varies. Unless the defendant is actually
without knowledge, it will be suppressed as sham.81 Such a
denial, even though true when made in the pleadings, may be
shown to be false at the time of the hearing.',, A defense based
on a salutary law is sufficient; 18 similarly of action pending; 100
cases where a question of credibility arises; 'I' or where too
complex a state of facts is presented; 12 or usury '9 or wager-
ing.9 4 Cases dealing with defenses that have been held sufficient
basis for denying the motion for summary judgment in actions
on bills and notes, 90 insurance claims,00 and implied contracts
Supp. 946 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1923). Compare the practice in the Con-
necticut rules, supra p. 441.
28 See infra p. 453.
187 Cf. Woodmere Academy v. Moskowitz, 212 App. Div. 457, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 578 (2d Dep't 1925) (action on bond subscription; denial entitled
defendant to defend); Rogan v. Coppermines Co., 117 Misc. 718, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (denial of sufficient information of assignment
in action on note); see Comm. Fuel Co. v. Powpit Co., 212 App. Div. 553,
556, 209 N. Y. Supp. 603, 606 (2d Dep't 1925).
188 See General Invest. Co. v. I. R. T. Co., supra note 155, at 141, 139
N. E. at 219; Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 147, at 648.
'18 Farnham Realty Co. v. Posner, 200 App. Div. 827, 193 N. Y. Supp.
788 (1st Dep't 1922) (housing law).
190 Ritz Carlton Co. v. Ditmars, 203 App. Div. 748, 197 N. Y. Supp. 405
(1st Dep't 1922).
'09 Posner v. Vogel, 198 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
102 Goldstein v. Korff, infra note 195.
293 Beckwith Agency v. Herald Pub. Co., 214 App. Div. 212, 212 N. Y.
Supp. 108 (1st Dep't 1925); C. I. T. Corp. v. Spence, 130 Misc. 659, 224
N. Y. Supp. 297 (Mun. Ct. 1927); of. Moers v. Exchange Bank, 208 App.
Div. 473, 203 N. Y. Supp. 727 (1st Dep't 1924) (where court held, in action
under statute to recover usury, that answer to the effect that the defendant
had taken it inadvertently in the belief that the plaintiff was a corporation
was sufficient to raise a question for the jury).
'9,1Perera v. Longone, 215 App. Div. 796, 213 N. Y. Supp. 418 (1st Dep't
1926).
195 Bills, notes and checks: a. Plaintiff not a holder in duo coursao
Christo v. Bayukas, 196 N. Y. Supp. 500 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Asbestos Finance
Co. v. Hazen, 122 Misc. 269, 203 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (plaintiff
in privity with the payee as to fraud and misrepresentation); Moir v.
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are collected in the footnotes.""' Where any of the defenses
raised are undisposed of, it has been held improper to grant the
m6tion. l s
Johnson, 211 App. Div. 427, 207 N. Y. Supp. 380 (4th Dep't 1925) (plain-
tiff took after maturity, in bad faith, and with notice); Doniger v. Lasoff,
125 Misc. 838, 211 N. Y. Supp. 486 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (plaintiff not evcn a
"holder"); Tidewater Oil Corp. v. Pierce, 213 App. Div. 190, 210 N. Y.
Supp. 759 (1st Dep't 1925) (assignment, fraud and misrepresentation);
Karpas v. Bandler, 218 App. Div. 418, 218 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1st Dep't
1926) (notice of conditional delivery of note).
b. Failure of consideration: Donnelly v. Bauder, 217 App. Div. 59, 216
N. Y. Supp. 437 (4th Dep't 1926) (nonnegotiable note); Berzon Sydeman
Co. v. Waumbeck Mfg. Co., 212 App. Div. 422, 208 N. Y. Supp. 715 (1st
Dep't 1925) (trade acceptance; denial of consideration); Franco v.
Schwartz, 225 N. Y. Supp. 739 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (accommodation indorze-
ment).
c. Forgery-alteration: Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Nat. City Bank, 120 Misc.
804, 200 N. Y. Supp. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (drawer's negligence), rcv'd,
208 App. Div. 83, 203 N. Y. Supp. 32 (lst Dep't 1924) ; Am. Surety Co. v.
Empire Trust Co., 128 Misc. 116, 217 N. Y. Supp. 673 (Sup. Ct. 1926)
(forged indorsements); Cohen v. Public Nat. Bank, 121- Misc. 163, 204
N. Y. Supp. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (denial of sufficient information and
knowledge).
d. Miscellaneozts: Goldstein v. Korif, 203 N. Y. Supp. 119 (Sup. Ct.
1924) (law and facts too complex); Gramercy Finance Corp. v. Greenberg,
127 Misc. 897, 217 N. Y. Supp. 224 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (collateral agrcement
not to hold defendant).
- Insurance claims: Peninsular Transp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 200 App. Div.
695, 193 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dep't 1922) (issues joined on subject and
amount of insurance, and cause and extent of loss); Dolge v. Ins. Co.,
211 App. Div. 112, 207 N. Y. Supp. 42 (2d Dep't 1924) (cqmplaint not
stating cause of action under accident insurance policy), aF'd vithout
opinion, 240 N. Y. 656, 148 N. E. 746 (1925).
97 Implied contract: Curry v. MacKenzie, 239 N. Y. 207, 140 N. E. 375
(1925) (issue as to cost or value in action for price of work and mater-
ials) ; Keystone Hardware Co. v. Tague, 246 N. Y. 79, 15S N. E. 27 (1927)
(counterclaim for specific performance or balance of purchase price in
action for money had and received); Frear v. Bailey, 127 Misc. 79, 214
N. Y. Supp. 675 (City Ct. 1926) (issue as to whether there had been an
account stated); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Colford, 123 Misc. 108, 20-1
N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (divorce set up in action for goods de-
livered to defendant's wife).
Summary judgment has also been denied in other actions where the fol-
lowing defenses were raised: Rawlins v. N. J. Ins. Co., 221 App. Div. 199,
223 N. Y. Supp. 85 (3d Dep't 1927) (issue whether undertaking declared upon
was "to stay execution"); Sorensen v. East River Savings Inst., 119 Misc.
297, 196 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (action for amount of deposit
given as gift; bank allowed to bring in parties to protect unkmown heirz'
interests); Alwais v. Assurance Corp., 211 App. Div. 734, 20S N. Y. Supp.
137 (1st Dep't 1925) (action on compromise of negligence actions: answer
setting up condition of contribution by another held good); Armleder Trucl:
Co. v. Barnes, 207 App. Div. 764, 204 N. Y. Supp. 472 (2d Dp't 1923)
(action for price of stock: answer setting up waiver and estoppel held for




Partial failure of the defenses or an absolute admission of lia-
bility for part of the claim is a necessary condition to a judgment
under Rule 114. Where the amount due is disputed,"", or the
admission is not absolute,200 the remedy is denied. Judgment
has been given where a bona fide counterclaim was set up against
part of the claim, the counterclaim being severed to be disposed
of separately.2- This practice was followed in Haiss v. Sehmuck-
ler, 02 where the court severed a claim for expenses and allowed
judgment for the remainder.
PRACTICE
A denial of the motion for summary judgment has been held
not to prejudice a later application.20 3 And in one case where
the appellate court held a summary judgment improperly
granted, the plaintiff was given leave to apply for partial judg-
ment.204 Loma Corp. v. Wing 20o represents an instance where
a jury assessment of damages was directed, the court refusing
to allow the defendant to obstruct judgment by a bare denial.
This, however, seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
Failure to give proper notice has been held to subject the order
to reversal.26 The court has no power to strike out some of
several defenses and order trial of the rest.20 7 Nor may it grant
a conditional summary judgment.208 Originally, the order was
(1st Dep't 1927) (co-partners being sued for balance due on option to
purchase realty: denial of partnership good); Schnitzler v. Tartell, 130
Misc. 565, 224 N. Y. Supp. 339 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (objection based upon
party-joinder upheld).
19 Warner v. Collier Distributing Corp., 218 App. Div. 354, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 262 (4th Dep't 1926).
199 Hilbring v. Mooney, 130 Misc. 273, 223 N. Y. Supp. 303 (City Ct.
1927).
200 Doctors' Service Corps v: Russell, 121 Misc. 600, 201 N. Y. Supp. 764
(Sup. Ct. 1923); Buffalo Theatre Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 218 App. Div.
669, 219 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1st Dep't 1926) ; Berson Sydeman Co. v. Waum-
beck Mfg. Co., supra note 195; of. Appelbaum v. Gross, supra note 163.20 Little Falls Dairy Co. v. Berghorn, 130 Misc. 454, 224 N. Y. Supp. 34
(Sup. Ct. 1927). But of. Dietz v. Glynne, 221 App. Div. 329, 223 X. Y.
Supp. 221 (2d Dep't 1927) ; see infra p. 453.2 02 Supra note 162.
203 Davison Coal Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., 193 N. Y. Supp. 883 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
20d Donnelly v. Bauder, supra note 195.
20 5 123 Misc. 222, 204 N. Y. Supp. 216 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
20 Aronstam v. Scientific Utilities Co., 196 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct.
1922) (4 day notice necessary), aff'd without opinion, 199 N. Y. Supp. 908
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1923).
207 King Motor Co. v. Allen, 209 App. Div. 281, 204 N. Y. Supp. 555
(4th Dep't 1924).
208 Gibson v. Casualty Co., 208 App. Div. 91, 203 N. Y. Supp. 53 (1st
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not considered appealable on the ground that no substantial right
of the parties was violated$a But there has since been a re-
versal of view.210
The treatment of counterclaims is an interesting and impor-
tant phase of the practice under the Rules. In Dell'Osso v.
Everett,- summary judgment was granted but execution stayed
until trial of the counterclaim. Professor Rothschild very prop-
erly criticized this order as being an.thing but "summary." "2
The Appellate Division later vacated the stay.213 A better course
is to treat the counterclaim as any other part of the answer:
if it appears to set up a substantial claim, it may operate as a
bar to the summary judgment; -4 otherwise, if it appears to be
sham and without basis.2' The courts will generally not allow
the set-off of an umnatured claim against a matured one.21
One fairly recent case severed the counterclaim for separate
trial, restraining the plaintiff from assigning a partial summary
judgment until after its trial. 227 In the same year, however, the
Second Department of the Appellate Division refused to follow
this, holding that, where the entire answer was stricken out, with
the answer would go the counterclaim, leaving nothing to be
tried.&2 The result would seem to be an indisposition on the part
of the busier courts to consider counterclaims in any other way
than as part of the answer. It may be pointed out that, in a few
rare instances, a defendant has availed himself of Rule 113 to
Dep't 1924) (reversing order granting motion unless, within 5 days, the
defendant should post security against judgment). But ef. the English
and New Jersey practice giving the defendant leave to defend on terms.
Sufpr pp. 433, 434, 443.
209 See Dwan v. Massarene, supra note 14S, at SS0, 192 N. Y. Supp.
at 583.
23 Interstate Paper Co. v. N. Y. Tribune, 207 App. Div. 453, 202 N. Y.
Supp. 232 (1st Dep't 1923) ; United Products Corp. v. Standard Textile Co.,
231 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1st Dep't 1928); see CLAnIx, op. cit. owpra note 147,
at 385.
2 1 119 Misc. 502, 197 N. Y. Supp. 423 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
2- Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 147, at 649.
21- 206 App. Div. 718, 200 N. Y. Supp. 840 (2d Dep't 1923), aff'd without
opinion, 238 N. Y. 551, 144 N. E. 887 (1924).
23,4 Melcher v. Graziano, 212 App. Div. 5S9, 209 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st
Dep't 1925) (counterclaim for defective merchandise in action for goods
sold and delivered); Wilkinson v. Electric Co., 123 Misc. 250, 20-1 N. Y.
Supp. 854 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
215 Goodman v. Wallach, 195 N. Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Smith v.
Cranleigh, 231 N. Y. Supp. 201 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928); cf. O'Neill v.
McKinley Co., 214 App. Div. 181, 212 N. Y. Supp. 7 (1st Dep't 1925) (coun-
terclaim adjudicated in former action).
216 Appleton v. Nat. Park Bank, 211 App. Div. 700, 208 N. Y. Supp. 228
(1st Dep't 1925) (unmatured note), aff'd without opinion, 2,11 X. Y. 501,
150 N. E. 555 (1925).
217 Little Falls Dairy Co. v. Berghorn, c:pra note 201.
218 Dietz v. Glynne, supra note 20L
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obtain a summary judgment on his counterclaim.21  There would
seem to be no reason for preventing further use of the remedy
in this situation.
OTHER MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT
It is well recognized that a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings under Rule 112 may not be supported by affidavits.2-  This
motion is to be decided from the face of the pleadings, not on
the merits as presented by the affidavits. 221 It is of interest to
note the case of Winter v. American Aniline Products,221 where
the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings for the
plaintiff for nominal damages was granted. Rule 112 ,Vith Rules
104, 105, 109 and 111 are, therefore, only of minor interest in
this study, since they are concerned either with reaching plead-
ing defects or with raising issues of law substantially as was done
under the common-law demurrer.223 It would seem, however,
that the tendency to observe an absolute distinction between the
motion for summary judgment and other motions is unnecessary
and possibly unfortunate. No reason appears why these, in some
cases at least, could not be used either alternatively or concur-
rently with salutary effect.
Under Rules 107 and 108 the defendant in New York is given
the opportunity to raise certain specified issues of fact by motion
for judgment with affidavits. 2 4 The procedure by affidavits of
the parties is in many ways similar to the summary judgment
procedure. 2 5 It seems a desirable method of quickly raising
219 See Rotenback v. Young, supra note 185, at 268, 196 N. Y. Supp. at
221. In 1926, a total of 7 summary judgments were taken by defendants
in New York county; 1927 shows the same figures.
220 Donnelly v. Bauder, supra note 195; Sabol v. Frost, o217 App. Div.
254, 217 N. Y. Supp. 757 (4th Dep't 1926); see Rabenstein v. Morehouse,
128 Misc. 385, 391, 219 N. Y. Supp. 560, 565 (Oneida County Ct. 1926);
Beha v. Weinstock, 129 Misc. 337, 339, 221 N. Y. Supp. 500, 502 (Sup Ct.
1927), rev'd, 247 N. Y. 221, 160 N. E. 17 (1928).
22- See Palermo v. Ins. Co., 201 N. Y. Supp. 106, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
N. Y. Consol. R. R. v. New York, 204 App. Div. 171, 173, 197 N. Y. Supp.
387, 389 (2d Dep't 1922).
222 204 App. Div. 792, 198 N. Y. Supp. 717 (1st Dep't 1923). This was
later reversed in the Court of Appeal on the ground that the complaint
stated a cause of action for substantial damages. 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E.
561 (1923); see Comment (1923) 9 CORN. L. Q. 70.
223 See Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 147, at 650-651.
Z24 Under the original rule four grounds of defect might be raised on
this procedure:, lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, lack of
jurisdiction of the subject of the action, incapacity of the plaintiff to sue,
and another action pending. In 1921 five other grounds were added: res
adjudicata, statute of limitations, release, statute of frauds, and infancy
or disability of the defendant. Under Rule 110 the plaintiff may follow a
somewhat similar procedure as to the defendant's counterclaim.
225 The court is careful to preserve the jury trial right. Herzog v.
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many continually recurring issues where the facts are clear and
only questions of law are presented.2r But since the defendant
has still the option of raising the issue by answer,2 and since
he is naturally less disposed to favor a speedy decision, it is not
as important a remedy as the summaly judgment.Ys
The seven year history of the New York summary judgment
is tinged with conservatism and is characterized by a decided
leaning toward great caution. In spite of this, it has proved
a great relief to the congestion in the New York courts, particu-
larly in the First and Second Departments. -" Hailed as "the
Brown, 217 App. Div. 402, 216 N. Y. Supp. 134 (1st Dep't 192G), aff'd
without opinion, 243 N. Y. 599, 154 N. E. 622 (1926); cf. Rothschild, Ncto
York Civil Practice Simplified (1926) 26 COL. L. Rmv. 30, 52; Rothschild,
New York Civil Practice Simplified (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rmv. 413.
226 Holland v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 210 App. Div. 129, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 397 (2d Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 239 N. Y. 005, 147 N. E.
214 (1925) (lack of jurisdiction); Zilmaur Realty Co. v. Pinlmey, 203 App.
Div. 467, 203 N. Y. Supp. 715 (1st Dep't 1924) (statute of frauds); Swan
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Mlisc. 500, 222 N. Y. Supp. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1927)
(accord and satisfaction); of. Atldnson, Pleading The Statute of LVii-ta-
tions (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 914, 931, 932, as to raising the issue of the
statute of limitations.
=7 Gentilala v. Fay Ta-icabs, 214 App. Div. 255, 212 N. Y. Supp. 101
(1st Dep't 1925), aff'd on this point, 243 N. Y. 397, 153 N. E. 34 (1926);
cf. Harmon v. Alfred Peats Co=, 243 N. Y. 473, 154 N. E. 314 (192G).
22S In general, see CLARK, op. cit. szfpra note 147, at 386, 37; Rothschild,
op. cit. sapra note 225; Atldnson, op. cit. svpra note 226.
.9 See Asbestos Finance Co. v. Hazen, 122 Misc. 2G9, 271, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 565, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (to the effect that the plaintiff would not
be harmed by being forced to try a just cause of action: "The C. P. A.
was never intended as a sharp-edged instrument to frustrate justice");
Rodger v. Bliss, 130 Misc. 168, 169, 223 N. Y. Supp. 401, 404 (Sup. Ct.
1927). But see Montgomery v. Lans, 194 N. Y. Supp. 90, 97 (Sup. Ct.
1922) (Rule should be liberally construed). The latter sentiment would
seem to find little support in the decisions.
20 See Finch, op. cit. supra note 21, at 593 where the writer estimatez
that, in 1923, one out of every ten cases was so disposed of in New York:
County, thus saving the time of one trial "part" for a year and a half.
In 1925, 511 motions for summary judgment were made; in 1920, 571;
in 1927, 433. Motions for judgment for the same period were: for 1923,
633; for 1926, 830; for 1927, 673. Of the 571 motions for summary judg-
ment made in 1926, 250 were granted, 177 denied, ,55 withdrawn, and S9
off calendar. In 1927, of the total of 433, 217 wcre granted, 134 denicd,
and 32 withdrawn. See JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE WORK OF THE SuPrIMD
COURT OF NEw YORK IN THE FIRST JUDICL% DEPARTMENT (1925) 21; JUDI-
CLAL STATISTICS OF THE W-ORK OF TIE SUPREIE COURT op Nr.w YOMK IN1 THlE
FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTIENT (1926) 21; JUrDICLu STATISTICS OF TurE WVO-
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK IN THE FIrzT JuDrIcAL Dz'P.mTMi;T
(1927) 21. Those off calendar in 1927 are not reported. This latter fact
would account for the falling off of the totals in 1927. The proportion
granted (with reference only to those denied) is 59-42 in 1920; 51-46 in
1927. This near balance would seem to indicate that the rmcdy has not
yet reached the peak of its efficacy.
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most salutary and satisfactory of the innovations introduced by
the Civil Practice Act," 231 it is yet to be developed to its highest
effectiveness. Such development seems to lie in the removal of
many of the present barriers, and in extension of the procedure
to other cases.
MICHIGAN
The Judicature Act of 1915 introduced into Michigan a sum-
mary judgment strikingly similar to the English rule, although
somewhat less extensive.232
"At any time after any cause arising out of contract or judg-
ment, or statute shall be at issue, upon motion of the plaintiff,
after the usual notice to the defendant, supported by the affidavit
of the plaintiff, or anyone in his behalf having knowledge of the
facts, verifying the plaintiff's cause of action, and stating the
amount claimed, and his belief that there is no defense to the
action, the court shall enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
unless the defendant shall prior to, or at the time of the hearing
said motion, make and file an affidavit of merits. Said affidavit
of merits shall state whether or not the defense claimed therein
applies to the whole of the plaintiff's claim, and if not, it shall
state definitely what item or items of the plaintiff's claim and
the amount thereof is admitted.
"If in any case it appear upon the trial thereof to the satis-
faction of the court, that any affidavit of merits made therein,
for the purpose of preventing a summary judgment, or for the
purpose of procuring a continuance, was not-made in good faith,
but was made solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
award the plaintiff in the judgment rendered therein, double the
amount of the costs taxable in the case."
The few recent cases which have reached the courts of highest
resort in Michigan deal mainly with the sufficiency of the affi-
davit. This must conform generally to the requirements estab-
lished in Circuit Rule 34.23 The provision for double costs as
a penalty for affidavits made for the purpose of delay is com-
mendable as lending greater efficacy to the statute.24 Although
restricted in scope, the Michigan summary judgment presents a
simple and clear example of expedited procedure.
1 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 1, at 650; of. Comment (1928) 6 N. Y.
U. L. REv. 59, 70.
232 3 MICH. CoMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) c. 234, §§ 12581, 12582.
233 Cf. Webster v. Pelavin, 241 Mich. 19, 216 N. W. 430 (1927) (affidavit
must state facts, not conclusions of law); Slebodnick v. La Buda, 238
Mich. 550, 213 N. W. 698 (1927) (averment of personal knowledge of the
acts stated). Mere statement that the plaintiff has a good cause of action
is insufficient. La Prise v. Smith, 234 Mich. 371, 208 N. W. 449 (1926).
234 Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5805, providing for double costs in
cases where a false affidavit or statement of merits has been made by the
defendant. The Connecticut Judicial Council in its first report recommends
that this be amended to permit of the allowance of reasonable counsel fees,
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Rule 73 of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
appeared about the time of the adoption of the English Rules of
1873. An overcrowded court docket seems to have been the im-
pelling force leading to its adoption.2- Its similarity to the
English summary judgment procedure is marked; it is limited,
however, to contract actions. The Rule provides:! -3
"In any action arising ex ont,'actze, if the plaintiff or his
agent shall have filed, at the time of bringing his action, an affi-
davit setting out distinctly his cause of action, and the sum
he claims to be due, exclusive of all set-offs and just grounds
of defense, and shall have served the defendant with copies
of his declaration and of said affidavit, he shall be entitled
to a judgment for the amount so claimed, with interest and co: s.
unless the defendant shall ifie, along with his plea, if in bar,
an affidavit of defense denying the right of the plaintiff as to
the whole or some specified part of his claim, and specifically
stating also, in precise and definite terms, the grounds of his
defense, which must be such as would, if true, be sufficient to
defeat the plaintiff's claim in whole or in part. And where the
defendant shall have- acknowledged in his affidavit of defense
his liability for part of the plaintiff's claim as aforesaid, the
plaintiff, if he so elect, may have judgment entered in his favor
for the amount so confessed to be due."
The provisions as to the affidavit and the partial judgment
closely follow the English model. Rule 19 of the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia provides for a like process in actions
for the recovery of land..2 37
not to exceed $50. FIRST REror or THE JUDICIL% COUNcu, or COi:N;rmi-
CUT (1928) 40.
23 See Cartter, C. J., in Nat. Met. Bank v. Hitz, 11 App. D. C. 193, 109
(1879): "This rule was adopted in this jurisdiction v.hcn ve vwere over-
whelmed with a great oppression of business. The calendar in the Circuit
o Court had run up to a thousand cases or thereabouts. Great delays in
judgment occurred; creditors were postponed in the collection to an in-
definite time. Defendants resorted to formal denials of pleading for the
purpose of securing the time that the delays of the law gave them."
See also Cropley v. Vogeler, 2 App. D. C. 28, 34 (1893): "The rapid
increase of the business of the courts of recent times, sufficient sometimes
to block the administration of justice, and the facility with which unwcrupu-
lous persons may use the ancient processes for the purpose of fraud and
delay, have induced throughout the United States the adoption of a very
general modification of our system of pleading and practice, and the ub-
stitution in the place of the old of new forms, based to a great extent on
the processes of the civil law."
20- RULES OF THE SUPRE' IE COURT OF THE DisTnic- or COLU.ILt, Rule
73, § 1. The power of the court to make rules of practice 2ens to have
been conferred as early as 1853. Cf. ABHmT, Conp. STAT. D. C. (194) 297
§ 81. The Rule is also to be found in Fidelity Co. v. United Statcz, 1ST
U. S. 315, 318, 23 Sup. Ct. 120, 121 (1902).
237 Cf. Columbia Laundry Co. v. Ellis, 36 App. D. C. 583 (1911); Pulliam
v. Capital Traction Co., 37 App. D. C. 301 (1911).
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As decided almost half a century later in New York the Rules
were held not to constitute a violation of the right to trial by
jury. Their inauguration was considered a proper exercise of
the power of the court to provide rules of practice.231 Naturally
enough, Rule 73, restricted as it was to actions ex contraotu,
was applied most frequently to actions on commercial paper and
on the several counts in assumpsit.23 Other situations where
the procedure was used were suits against principal and surety
on a construction bond; -0 by the beneficiary of an insurance
certificate; 2 41 and on an award.242 It was early decided that
unliquidated damages were not recoverable under the Rule.42
Assertions made in the affidavit must be plain and positive.Y"
Participial averments, however, do not render it bad.2 4 Al-
though a technical nicety is not required, the plaintiff must
conform to all the requirements of the Rule. 240  No affidavit by
the plaintiff in reply is provided for.24 7 The allowance of amend-
ment is in the discretion of the trial cour 48 The plaintiff may
not, by anticipating defenses, require the defendant to negative
or defend against such new matter.2 4 Indeed the facts set forth
in the defendant's affidavit are assumed to be true as a safeguard
of the right to jury trial. This is in line with the consistent
policy in this jurisdiction of construing the plaintiff's affidavit
strictly, while the defendant's affidavit is broadly construed. 01
238 Smoot v. Rittenhouse, 27 Wash. L. Rep. 741 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1876),
cited in Fidelity Co. v. United States, supra note 236, at 319, 23 Sup. Ct.
at 122; Cropley v. Vogeler, supra note 235; see Nat. Met. Bank v. Hitz,
supra note 235, at 199.
239 Cropley v. Vogeler, supra note 235 (common counts for goods sold
and delivered); Strauss v. Hensey, 7 App. D. C. 289 (1895) (money
counts); Riley v. Mattingly, 42 App. D. C. 290 (1914) (general counts and
account for legal services).
240 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. U. S., supra note 236.
2- Woodmen of the World v. Davis, 48 App. D. C. 614 (1911).
242 Bailey v. District of Columbia, 4 App. D. C. 356 (1894).
243 Deane v. Echols, 2 App. D. C. 522 (1894). But cf. Mearns v. Chatard,
47 App. D. C. 257 (1918) (suit for proceeds of converted stock; recovery
allowed of value at time of conversion).
244 See Foertsch v. Germuiller, 2 App. D. C. 340, 345 (1894).
245 Gundersheimer v. Earnshaw, 13 App. D. C. 178 (1898).
246 Williams v. Bradley, 2 App. D. C. 346 (1894); see Young v. Warner,
6 App. D. C. 433, 436-437 (1895).
247 See The Richmond v. Cake, 1 App. D. C. 447, 465 (1893).
2- McReynolds v. Mtge. & Acceptance Corp., 13 F. (2d) 313 (Ct. of App.
D. C. 1926); Meyers v. Davis, 13 App. D. C. 361 (1898).
249 Booth v. Arnold, 27 App. D. C. 287 (1906). But of. Woodmen of the
World v. Davis, supra note 241, distinguishing Booth v. Arnold and stating
that this does not necessarily render the affidavit ineffective; the excess
may be disregarded.
250 See St. Clair v. Conlon, 12 App. D. C. 161, 165 (1898); Gleason
v. Hoeke, 5 App. D. C. 1, 5 (1894); Lawrence v. Hammond, 4 App. D.
C. 467, 469 (1874); Meyers v. Davis, supra note 248, at 367; also Alvey,
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The plaintiff's attorney is deemed to be the plaintiff's agent for
the purpose of making affidavits.=' An explicit provision states
who may make an affidavit in behalf of a corporation.2:2 Where
several defendants have the same defense, an affidavit by only
one is sufficient.2 - The entire absence of an affidavit of defense
is fatal to the defendant's cause. -"  In Conszumcrs' Brcwzg Co.
v. Tobin,25 where the plaintiff conceded a credit claimed by the
defendant in his affidavit, summary judgment was denied. The
fact that the defense appears unreasonable cannot affect the de-
fendant's right to trial.2- r, The order granting summary judg-
ment is appealable.
The summary judgment has been treated with conservatism
in the District of Columbia. Recent cases are few. It is not
improbable that the stimulus of more crowded court dockets will
lead to its extension along the more liberal lines of the English
and Connecticut provisions.
ILLINOIS
In 1872, because of "delays in the administration of jus-
tice," 258 Illinois adopted a rule which had been enforced in Cook
County since 1853. In its present form 2" the rule reads:
"If the plaintiff in any suit upon a contract, express or im-
plied, for the payment of money, shall file with his declaration
an affidavit showing the nature of his demand, and the amount
due him from the defendant, after allowing to the defendant all
his just credits, deductions and set-offs, if any, he shall be en-
titled to judgment, as in case of default, unless the defendant,
C. J., in Strauss v. Hensey, sztpra note 239, at 294: "The court cannot
question or traverse the truth of the facts stated in the defendant's affi-
davit. Those facts the court is bound, for the purposes of securing to the
defendant the right to trial, to assume to be true, and that, too, without
reference to what the plaintiff may have stated in his affidavit; . .
25 -Harris v. Leonhardt, 2 App. D. C. 318 (1894).
2Z2 Rule 73, § 3: "When the defendant is a corporation, the affidavit of
defense may be made by an officer, agent or attorney of such corporation."
Cf. the Connecticut rule, supra p.
253 Tyrer v. Chew, 7 App. D. C. 175 (1895).
254 Boogher v. Byers, 10 App. D. C. 419 (1897) (plea of the statute of
limitations, unsupported by affidavits, raises presumption of the revival
of the claim by acknowledgment); Finney v. Pa. Iron Worhs Co., 22 App.
D. C. 476 (1902); cf. Pumphrey v. Bogan, 8 App. D. C. 449 (1896) (where
issue is raised as to the new promise after the statute has run, surmary
judgment was refused).
255 18 App. D. C. 584 (1901).
256 See Gleason v. Hoeke, svpra note 250, at 7.
25 Johnson v. Wright, 2 App. D. C. 216 (1894).
258111. Laws 1872, 338, § 36; see Cooper v. Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 1, 5
(1927); Mleans v. Miner, 243 111. App. 556, 561 (1927).
2,59ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 110, § 55, cf. Common Law Procedure
Act of 1852, silpra note 43.
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or his agent or attorney, shall file with his plea an affidavit,
stating that he verily believes the defendant has a good defense
to said suit upon the merits to the whole or a portion of the
plaintiff's demand, and specifying the nature of such de-
fense, .
The statute further provides that no affidavit of merits need
be filed with a demurrer or motion; that the time for filing
affidavits may be extended on good cause; and that the plaintiff
may in cases of surprise, have a continuance over to the next
term to produce evidence. Provision is also made for partial
judgment by default. The course of decision as to the sufficiency
of the affidavits and as to the partial judgment seems to be more
liberal than the tenor of the cases under the English rule.213 1
The Illinois procedure, in its terms, is simple and, within its
limits (contract actions), has proved to be an efficacious
remedy.201
DELAWARE
In Delaware, provision is made for "snap judgments" or
"judgments, at first term" in certain enumerated classes of cases
and under a designated procedure, all of which show many of
the features of the English summary judgment. It is pro-
vided::262
"In all actions in the Superior Court upon bills, notes, or bonds
or other instruments in writing for the payment of money,62" or
for the recovery of book accounts,2" on foreign judgments,205
and in all actions of scire facias on recognizances in the Or-
phans' Court and Courts of Chancery, judgments or mort-
gages,2 60 judgment by default shall be entered upon motion by
the plaintiff or his attorney on the last day of the regular term
to which the original process is returnable, notwithstanding
appearance by the defendant, unless the defendant, or if there
be more than one, one or more of them, shall have previously
filed in the cause an affidavit267 stating that he or they verily
260 See the cases listed in 11 CALLAGHAN, ILLINOIS DIGEST (1925) 11257
et seq.
261 See cases listed ibid.
202 DEL. REV. CODE (1915) c. 128, § 6.
23 A written receipt or check given by the defendant has been held
not to be such an instrument. Green v. Trust Co., 25 Del. 585, 83 Atl.
935 (1912); Spruance v. Gray, 30 Del. 117, 102 AtI. 529 (1917). And in
action on a building contract for the recovery of the agreed price, tho
court refused to find an unconditional obligation for the payment of
money, the condition being the completion of the contract. Swayne v.
Remley, 1 Penn. 1, 39 Atl. 453 (Del. 1897).264 Cf. Taylor v. Addicks, 4 Penn. 411, 55 At. 1010 (Del. 1903) (unitem-
ized claims for attorney's services not book entries within the statute).265 Koury v. Claymont Develop. Co., 32 Del. 115, 119'Atl. 858 (1923).
26 Goodfriend v. Light & Power Co., 31 Del. 194, 112 Atl. 831 (1921)
(foreclosure).
26The usual requirement is made that the affidavit contain facts, not
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believeq or believe there is a legal defense to the whole or part
of such cause of action, and setting forth the nature and char-
acter of the same; if the defense be to a part only of the cause
of action, the defendant, or if there be more than one, any
one of them shall, in such affidavit, specify the sum which he or
they admit to be due, and judgment shall be entered for the
plaintiff at his election for the sum aclmowledged to be due; Pro-
vided, that no judgment shall be entered by virtue of this sec-
tion unless the plaintiff, or if there be more than one,-cs some
one or more of the plaintiffs shall, on or before the first day of
the term 2 '9 to which the original process is returnable, file in
the office of the Prothonotary a copy of the instrument of writ-
ing, . . ."
A stay of execution for six months must be granted upon se-
curity being given by the defendant for the payment of such
judgment. Upon sufficient cause, the court may open such judg-
ment and let the defendant into a trial, security being given. In
case of a suit by or against a corporation, the affidavit by the
cashier or treasurer is sufficient.2 o If no judgment is entered,
any affidavit filed under this section by either party to the action
may not be used in such action for any purpose whatever.
The courts are averse to "snap judgments" except in clear
cases.2 7 -1  The defendant's affidavits are usually considered
true 2 2 and, where there is doubt at all, "judgments at first
term" and not granted.2 7 3 Although a mere statement by the de-
fendant of a belief that he has a defense is not enough,2. the
tendency is to hold the defenses interposed sufficient as a bar. =-
Although this procedure is a sufficient safeguard against purely
conclusions of law. Reynolds v. Fahey, 4 Penn. 264, 55 Atl. 221 (Del.
1903).
2$s Where the capacity of the party appears in the caption, it need not
be expressly averred in the affidavit. Jersawit v. Banning,32 Del. 47, 118
Atl. 727 (1922); Koury v. Claymont Develop. Co., p -a note 265 (part-
ners).
269 Cf. Miller v. Hart, 3 Penn. 297, 51 Atl. 603 (Do]. 1901) (where the
affidavit of demand was filed before the action was brought the motion for
judgment was refused); followed in Goodfriend v. Light & Power Co.,
supra note 266.
270 Of. Wilmington Sash & Door Co. v. Taylor, 25 Del. 528, 82 Ati. SG
(1911), holding that the treasurer of the plaintiff corporation should have
sworn to his capacity in the affidavit. Judgment will not be grantcd
to a corporation unless the fact and place of its creation are averred.
Toerring Co. v. Moore Co., 24 Del. 269, 75 AtI. 786 (1910).
271 See Spruance v. Anderson, 27 Del. 414, 415, 89 AtI. 1 (1913).
272 Layton v. Lawson, 27 Del. 143, 86 Atl. 520 (1913) ; Otis Elevator Co.
v. Ford, 27 Del. 286, 88 Atl. 465 (1913).
27 Davenport v. Addicks, 5 Penn. 4, 57 Atl. 532 (Del. 1904).
274 Potts v. Wells, 3 Penn. 11, 50 Atl. 62 (Del. 1900).
2- Examples of some of the defenses upheld are: Bloom v. Handloff,
29 Del. 172, 97 Atl. 586 (1916) (denial of indebtedness); Layton v. Law-
son, supra note 272 (res adjudicata); Ridings v. McMenamin, 1 Penn.
15, 39 Al 463 (Del. 1897) (payment); Thomas v. Franhhouser, 28 DeL
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formal defenses set up for delay in the enumerated actions, it
is open to the twofold criticism that it does not cover as wide
a field as it might practically embrace, and that the attitude of
the courts is conservative.
PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania motion for judgment under section 17 of
the Practice Act presents a greatly modified version of the Eng-
lish type of summary judgment. 276 It provides shortly that:
"In actions of assumpsit the prothonotary may enter judgment
for want of an affidavit of defense for any amount admitted
or not denied to be due. The plaintiff may take a rule for judg-
ment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense to the whole
or any part of his claim,277 and the court shall enter judgment or
discharge the rule as justice may require. When the defendant
sets up a set-off or counterclaim, he may move for judgment
against the plaintiff for want of a reply, or for want of a suf-
ficient reply to the whole or any part of the set-off or counter-
claim, and the court may enter judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff or defendant for such amount as shall be found due, with
leave to proceed for the balance." -s
The act was, according to a late dictum,279 intended to "sim-
plify proceedings, and to reach the real issues as speedily as pos-
sible. .. ." Section 17 would seem, however, to operate merely
as a provision for default judgment in the absence of defending
affidavits in actions of assumpsit. It therefore seems limited in
application. Special emphasis is placed on the rule that there
will be no reversal unless the error is clear.280
INDIANA
The Indiana legislature, as early as 1887, dealt with the prob-
lem of expediting trial procedure. The statute, unmodified
after an existence of over forty years, provides that:
21, 90 At. 465 (1914) (failure of consideration on note); Collins v. Han-
sen, 2 Penn. 155, 44 Atl. 624 (Del. 1899) (payment of mortgage).
270 Pennsylvania, although not a "code reform" state, adopted a simpli-
fied Practice Act in 1915. See Amram, The PennsVlvania Practice Act of
1915 (1916) 64 U. or PA. L. REV. 223.
277 ROSENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 43, at 51, n. 24, points out the similar-
ity of this clause to the English provisions.
278 SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA P.AcTic ACT (2d ed. 1926) 261; PA. STAT.
(West, 1920) § 17197; AMA m, PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE ACT (1925) 211.
279 See Fulton Farmers' Ass'n v. Bomberger, 262 Pa. 43, 47, 104 At].
805, 807 (1918).
28oKidder Elevator Co. v. luckle, 198 Pa. 388, 48 At]. 272 (1901);
Wilson v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 225 Pa. 143, 73 At]. 1071 (1909) ; Comm.
Finance Co. v. Ferrero, 269 Pa. 264, 112 Atl. 449 (1921); Prudential
Realty Co. v. Cohen, 279 Pa. 279, 123 At]. 920 (1924).
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
"An answer or other pleading shall be rejected as sham, either
when it plainly appears upon the face thereof to be false in fact
or merely intended for delay, or when shoun to be so by the
answers of the parties to special written interrogatories pro-
pounded to him to ascertain whether the pleading is
false .... 281
Except for the written interrogatories clause this provision
is merely a slight extension of the common-law practice xith
respect to sham pleas. As far as the reports show, it has not
been very freely employed. In Holl nd z. Flctcicr 2 it was held
that the answers to the interrogatories must unequivocally show
that the pleading was false. The remedy prescribed is by no
means complete. At its best it serves only as a means of clarify-
ing the opponent's pleadings.2-  Although its use is not re-
stricted to any specified forms of action it is, in effect, only
the bare embryo of a summary judgment.
VIRGINIA
The origin of the summary proceeding by motion for judg-
ment has been attributed to Virginia.2-"  The use of the pro-
cedure against sheriffs and other officers, sureties, attorneys,
and on execution bonds began as early as 1732.26,5 By 1849, at
the time of the adoption of the first of the Codes, sentiment
toward widening the scope of the procedure crystallized in its
extension to the use of "any person entitled to recover money
by action on any contract." 23 13 In 1919, after a number of in-
termediate steps,'5 7 it had been made to include within its
borders all actions at law.82
2M IND. AxN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 409, providing also for the strildng
of "surplusage, tautology and irrelevant matter."
28 62 Ind. App. 149, 112 N. E. 847 (1916). Examination of the party
has been held, also, to be regulated by IND. AN . STAT. (Burns, 1001) §
517 (dealing with examination of witnesses). Stars v. Hammersmith,
31 Ind. App. 610, 67 N. E. 554 (1903).
s'8 Cf. Atldnson, v. Wabash R. R., 143 Ind. 501, 41 N. E. 947 (1895),
holding it error to reject a pleading in its entirety when a part of it is
relevant.
2 4 See Millar, op. cit. svpra note 6, at 213, 215.
2z For a full list of the subjects covered by the statutes in their chron-
ological order, see ibid. 215 ct seq.
2S6 VA. CODE (1849) c. 167, § 5.
2s7 Va. Acts 1912, 15-to tort actions; Va. Acts 1912, 651---etended to
actions for damages arising out of breach of contract and to statutory
penalties; Va. Acts 1914, 28--to the recovery of money, damages or a
penalty in an action at law (superseding Va. Acts 1912, 15); Va. Actz
1916, 760-to recovery of specific personal property or damages and to
statutory penalties. Millar, op. cit. sz'pra note 6, at 217-219, dizcuzzes
fully the time modifications during this period and the changing require-
ments as to the necessity of a vriting.
-s VA. CODE AN. (1919) c. 251, § 6046, was then adopted along with a
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"Any person entitled to maintain an action at law may, in
lieu of such action at law, proceed by motion before any court
which would have jurisdiction of such action, after not less than
fifteen days' notice, which notice shall be in writing signed by
the plaintiff or his attorney, and shall be returned to the clerk's
office of such court within five days after service of the same....
"The defendant may make the same defenses to the notice
as to a declaration in an action at law, and in the same man-
ner, or he may state his grounds of defense informally in writ-
ing, and in the latter event the parties shall be deemed to be
at issue on the grounds stated without replication or other plead-
ing on the part of the plaintiff. No plea in abatement under
this section shall be received after the defendant has demurred,
pleaded in bar or filed such statement of his grounds of defense."
The noteworthy feature of this section is the complete ab-
sence of any requirement of formality.2 1 Indeed its wording
contemplates that the notices be acts of the parties rather than
of their attorneys. In spite of the freedom here permitted the
notice must state d good cause of action; it must be a notice.,"
Moreover, either party may demand a bill of particulars." ' The
total effect of the provision is a simplification of the pleadings,
thus enabling the plaintiff to move much more rapidly than he
otherwise could.2 02
Section 6047 allows the plaintiff to move against a number of
defendants either jointly or severally, or against an intermediate
number. "Such motions may be made from time to time until
there is a judgment against every person liable, or his personal
representative." The next section (6048) provides that when
an issue of fact is joined and either party, desires it or, when
in the opinion of the court, it is proper, a jury shall be im-
paneled.293
mechanism for transferring cases from law to equity or vice versa as a
compromise measure for those who clamored for the adoption of the Code.
"These two changes, it was thought, would give the advocates of Code
procedure full opportunity to develop the merits of the system, and if
they proved more satisfactory than the present system, the transition
would be much easier than by a complete substitution of one for the
other .. ." I VA. CODE ANN. (1919). xii-dii; cf. Williams, Remedy by
Motion Under the Code of 1919 (1920) 6 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 1, for a general
discussion and comparison with § 3211, et seq. of the Code of 1904.
289 See Whitley v. Booker Brick Co., 113 Va. 434, 436, 74 S. E. 160, 161
(1912); Chandler v. Baltimore R. R., 125 Va. 63, 67, 99 S. E. 794, 79,5
(1919); cf. (1911) 16 VA. L. REG. 950, 952 (editorial favoring the re-
duction of the whole system of pleading to a single notice stating the object
of the suit).
290 Makin v. Aldridge, 127 Va. 761, 105 S. E. 459 (1920).
291 See ibid. 766, 105 S. E. at 461; Whitley v. Booker Brick Co., Slpre
note 289, at 436, 74 S. E. at 161.
292 See Millar, op. cit. supra note 6, at 220.
298 Cf. Preston v. Salem Improvement Co., 91 Va. 583, 22 S. E. 486
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The latter part of section 6046 and section 6133 represent
a combination of the subjects embraced in the statutes of 1349
and, to a certain extent, the English summary judgment. They
apply the procedure specified in section 6046 respectively to
actions on account and in assumpsit. As in many other juris-
dictions, a number of the cases deal with the sufficiency of the
affidavit.2 This is not, however, in this jurisdiction, an indica-
tion of an unfavorable attitude of the courts. Indeed the ten-
dency in Virginia seems to be to replace the technical common
law formns with this informal motion for judgment.:
WEST VIRGINIA
The Virginia proceeding by motion of 1849 was adopted by
West Virginia shortly after its creation as a separate jurisdic-
tion.
It is distinguishable from its predecessor only in that it is
limited to contract actions for money, and in its formal provision
as to affidavits.2 96 Defense "may be made in the same manner
and to the same extent as in actions at law." This latter has
been held to be permissive and not mandatory * 7  The cases
have rigidly required that the "notice" function of the notice
be strictly observed.- s Since it replaces the declaration and
summons in the ordinary action it must reasonably indicate upon
what obligation judgment is sought.-' As to the affidavit, that
need not set forth a cause of action.* Jmy trial may be had
under the same circumstance as under the Virginia procedure,
except that no jurisdictional amount is specified as in the latter
state (over twenty dollars).
The arrested development of the summary remedy in West
Virginia is conspicuous. In spite of this, as it has been pointed
out,' it has recently been applied to fully one half of the con-
tracf actions litigated and its use is becoming more general.
(1895), holding this provision not a violation of the right to a jury trial;
(1895) 1 V.A L. REG. 449.
294  Carpenter v. Gray, 113 Va. 518, 75 S. E. 300 (1912), holding sub-
stantial compliance with the requirement sufficient; of. Jones v. Hancoch,
117 Va. 511, 85 S. E. 460 (1915); Merriman Co. v. Thomas, 103 Va. 214,
48 S. E. 590 (1904) (as to capacity of affiant).
295 See Millar, op. cit. supra note 6, at 221.
296 W. VA. CODE AN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 121, § 6. For a discussion of
both the Virginia and West Virginia statutes, see Note (1922) 29 W. VA.
L. Q. 62.
29 Collins v. White Fuel Co., 69 W. Va. 292, 71 S. E. 277 (1911); Cce
Millar, op. cit. supra note 6, at 222.
29S Anderson v. Prince, 60 W. Va. 557, 55 S. E. 656 (190G).
29 See Stuart v. Carter, 79 W. Va. 92, 98, 90 S. E. 537, 540 (1910);
see Jennings v. Wiles, 82 W. Va. 573, 575, 96 S. E. 1009, 1010 (1918).
o Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 117 S. E. 085 (1923).
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SOUTH CAROLINA AND KENTUCKY
The "summary process" of 1769 of South Carolina and the
Kentucky "proceedings by petition or summons" of 1805 are of
historical interest. The former made it lawful for the judges
"to determine, without a jury, in a summary way, on petition,
all causes cognizable in the said courts, for any sum not ex-
ceeding 209 sterling, except where the title of lands may come
in question . . ." The latter was "a summary mode of recover-
ing debts" for any person holding a bond or a note for the
direct payment of money. This remedy was adopted in Ala-
bama in 1820; in Illinois in 1833; and in territorial Kansas in
1855. It was used as a model and amplified in Missouri in
1825 to include actions on bonds or notes for the direct payment
of property or money; in Arkansas in 1837 to include actions
on bills; in the Iowa territory in 1839 to include actions on in-
struments payable in money. Professor Millar 1 2 has ascribed
the spread of the statute to emigration from Kentucky, and
credits whatever success it enjoyed to the fact that the set
form of the petition allowed the plaintiff to serve as his own
attorney.3 3 The remedy was at its best but a makeshift and the
adoption of the Codes marked its end in each jurisdiction.,"
III
In the remainder of the American jurisdictions where a pro-
cedure of a summary nature is found, it seems to have been
affected by moral considerations. The provisions include, in
the main, expedited proceedings against public officers and pri-
vate citizens who are in a quasi-fiduciary relation to the plain-
tiff. These provisions afford, in general, a direct remedy for
the wrongful omissions or commissions of the persons specified.
30, Millar, op. cit. supra note 6, at 223, n. 164.
302 For a full discussion of these statutes see Millar, op. cit. upr note
6, at 195 et seq., 204 et seq.
303 Ibid. 212.
304 In Kentucky in 1851; in Alabama in 1852; in Illinois in 1874 (dropped
from the state books); in Kansas in 1859; in Iowa in 1851. Millar, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 213, discusses the now extinct "bank notice" which ap-
peared in the charters of early Alabama and Mississippi banks. A typical
example of the provision is to be found in Logwood v. Bank, Minor 23
(Ala. 1820): that if any person default in payment of any note, bill or
bond to the bank, on ten days' notice and by producing before tha court
the certificate of the president of the bank that the debt is the bona fido
property of the bank, the bank may move for judgment. Provided, that if
the defendant appear and contest the claim, the court shall immediately
impanel a jury to try the issue and give judgment accordingly. This is
perhaps, a forerunner of our modern summary judgment. Cf. English
Bills of Exchange Act of 1855, supra note 2.
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This type of procedure would seem to be of purely American
origin, dating back to the end of the eighteenth century.
ALABAMIA
The Alabama Code presents the fullest example of the type of
procedure herein to be discussed. It provides ' that:
"Judgment may be rendered summarily against the persons
and for the defaults hereinafter stated, upon notice in writing
by the person aggrieved, that a motion will be made for judg-
ment succinctly stating in such notice the cause for which the
motion will be made, and the session of the court, and the
county.
"The motion may be made by the party aggrieved or his legal
representative against the person in default and the sureties
on his official bond; and the judgment must be rendered against
such of the parties, whether principal or surety, as may have
received notice of the intended motion."
A motion entered on the motion docket during the session of
the court is sufficient notice to all officers of the court and their
sureties.
"Unless in cases otherwise directed by this chapter, the court
must hear and determine the motion and render judgment upon
the evidence, without a jury unless an issue is tendered, and a
jury trial demanded when a jury must be immediately im-
panelled to try the facts, unless good cause be shown for a
continuance."
There is then enumerated :0 a list of the proceedings that may
be brought. Included are actions against sheriffs, coroners and
other executive officers for: (a) failure to return execution, or
pay over money collected; (b) failure to make money on execu-
tion; (c) false and fraudulent return; (d) failure to give notice
of collection of money; (e) failure to indorse on execution true
date of delivery; (f) failure to execute mesne process; (g) fail-
ure to pay over to the defendant excess received on sales; (h)
failure to return execution satisfied; (i) failure to refund money
when collection has been enjoined.
There are also included proceedings in favor of sheriffs or
coroners; against clerks and registers; against judges of probate,
tax collectors, assessors, county treasurers, and other persons re-
ceiving money for county; against attorneys at law for property
or money recovered and not turned over.
The notice periods vary between three and ten days. Where
prescribed, the record must affirmatively show that it has been
given.3'7 Where none is provided, the courts, nevertheless, re-
305 ALA. CrI. CODE (1923) c. 346, art. 1, §§ 10226-10229.
06 Ibid. art. 2, §§ 10232-10241, arts. 3-6.
so' Arthur v. State, 22 Ala. 61 (1853); see Caldwell v. Guinn, 54 Ala.
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quire a reasonable notice. 30 Since the notice in the proceedings
fulfills the function of both process and pleading, it is amend-
able unaer the same rules as obtain in ordinary actions.3°  That
the procedure is intended to be of a punitive nature is indi-
cated by the enumeration of penalties for the various delin-
quencies. °o This is the prevailing tone of the devices discussed
in this section.
KENTUCKY, ARKANSAS, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA,
MISSOURI
Kentucky. The Kentucky code provides:
"A judgment may be obtained on motion, by a surety against
his principal or co-surety for money paid; by a client against
his attorney for money collected or property received; by a
party or officer against a surety for costs; and by a party
against an officer for money collected or property received,
and for the damages which such party is entitled to recover;
and in all other cases specially authorized by statute; and the
service of the notice shall be regarded as the commencement
of the proceeding." -r
This same remedy is extended to enable a purchaser at an
execution sale of land to obtain possession.312 Although written
pleadings are not necessary,5 if one of the parties proceeds
in writing, the other should follow suit.3 14 Because of the ex-
emplary nature of the proceedings the courts require a rigid
conformity with the terms of the statute. 31
A'kansas. The summary proceedings by motion in Arkansas
parallels that in Kentucky very closely. The statute is as fol-
lows:
"Judgments and final orders may be obtained on motion, by
sureties against their principals (a) sureties against co-sureties,
for recovery of money due them on account of payments made
by them as such; by clients against attorneys (b) plaintiffs in
execution against sheriffs, constables and other officers (c) for
the recovery of money or property collected for them and dam-
ages, and in all other cases specially authorized by statute." 16
64, 66 (1875). Indeed, the record must contain all the material facts neces-
sary to entitle the plaintiff to the summary remedy. See Enloe v. Reilke,
56 Ala. 500, 503, (1876); Yancey v. Hankins, Minor 171 (Ala. 1823).
308 Brown v. Wheeler, 3 Ala. 288 (1842).
309 Palmer v. Fitts, 51 Ala. 489 (1874).
31o See Chandler v. Vandegrift Shoe Co., 94 Ala. 233, 235, 10 So. 353,
353 (1891).
311 KY. CODES ( Carroll, 1927) c. 5, § 444.
312 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 1689.
313 KY. CODES (Carroll, 1927) c. 5, § 449.
3.14Ashcraft v. Bowling, 193 Ky. 31, 234 S. W. 945 (1921).
315 See Hall v. Commonwealth, 71 Ky. 378, 382 (1871); Whitaker v. Hol-
comb, 210 Ky. 836, 837, 276 S. W. 973, 974 (1925).
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Here, although written pleadings are not required, a rule of
strict construction seems to prevail 17  Moreover, the remedy
is denied where the defendant's verified answer sets up an issue
of fact.3'5 This would seem to be an adoption of the rule usually
found in the broader type of summary judgment.
Tennessee. Tennessee presents another example of the Ken-
tucky type of summary proceedings: It also includes within its
scope actions against certain designated officers and against
sureties and indorsers.-I There is a dearth of adjudications on
the subject.
West Virginia. In addition to the remedy by way of summary
proceeding in contract actions described above, West Virginia
provides for judgment on motion in actions on official bonds. =0
The separation of this provision from the former is further in-
dication of the difference between the two types of procedure.
Missouwri. The Missouri statute is worthy of consideration
merely by virtue of a provision for judgment by motion in
actions by sureties against principals for reimbursement after
adverse judgment. 2  Under the modern third party notice de-
vice, the necessity for this is perhaps non-existent.2
Our long and slow journey through the summary procedure
rules and statutes of the British Empire and the United States
is now completed. It will serve to show that there still exists,
to a considerable extent, the ancient hesitation to press a
defendant in a law suit to prompt action. Mlost of the cases in
our courts of general jurisdiction which go to judgment event-
ually result in judgments for the plaintiff224  It results, there-
51 6 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) c. 102, art. iv, § 0250.
:=Ibid. § 6254; see Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Kittrell, 107 Ark.
361, 362, 155 S. W. 496, 497 (1913); Cooley v. Lovewell, 95 Ark. 567, SS,
130 S. W. 574, 574 (1910).
S Shackleford v. Ford, 172 Ark. 527, 290 S. W. 43 (1927); Davies v.
Patterson, 132 Ark. 484, 201 S. W. 504 (1917).
r" TENN. ANN. CODE (Thompson's Shannon, 1918) c. 14; ef. Phillips v.
Landess, 280 S. W. 694 (Tenn. 1926).
=0 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 121, § 5.
-32 Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) c. 116, § 12697.
322 See (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 712.
32- Compare the essoins allowed the defendant in early practice. 2
HoLswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 103,-104, 475; 3
ibid. 623-627; 2 PoLLocx AND IBTLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LxW (2d
ed. 1899) 562-3; BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLUND (ISO) 230
et seq.
-4 Thus the recent studies in court administration conducted by the
Yale School of Law indicate that ten judgments are entered for plaintiffs
to every one for defendants. Even in the contested cases the proportion
is three to one in favor of the plaintiff. See Clark, Fact Rcscarch in Lazo
Administration (1928) 2 CONN. B. J. 211, 218, 225, Tables "A" and "C'."
The results in contested cases in New York City are similar. See JuDIncLL
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fore, that the delay is, for the most part, at the expense of the
one who, by the law of probabilities, is the more deserving
of the parties. To the extent that our courts are permitting
avoidable delay, to that extent are they denying justice.
The reluctance to force defendants to judgment appears in
the restricted scope of the summary judgment. Only in Indiana
and Virginia is it availablb generally in civil actions. In the
former jurisdiction it is a weak and ineffective provision which
does not embrace the handing down of final judgment. In the
latter, it has not the direct forcefulness of procedure which ac-
companies the English type of summary judgment. In all other
jurisdictions, the kinds of action in which it may be employed
are carefully specified. The Ontario and Connecticut rules are,
however, sufficiently broad to cover, in all probability, the actions
where the remedy may be most effectively used. In view of the
customary detailed description of the actions in which the pro-
'cedure is available it is interesting to note the brevity of the
provisions suggested by the American Judicature Society in its
model rules for "Judgment upon Discovery." This is available
in actions: "(1) Where the plaintiff's claim is for a liquidated
sum; (2) By a landlord against his tenant for the possession
of real property, with or without a claim, for rent or mesne
profits; (3) In the recovery of specific chattels." 021 Only the
Ontario rules include all these actions thus briefly described al-
though the Connecticut rule is in other respects more extensive
than either.
It is true that the motion for summary judgment may on
occasion be made an instrument of delay. If it is made in an
action where its denial is to be expected, some time must neces-
sarily be consumed in disposing of it before the case can proceed
in ordinary course. This is the justification for refusing to per-
mit it in cases of unliquidated claims. Against this it may be
urged, however, that, since the option of moving for the judg-
ment lies with that party ordinarily most anxious to proceed
with the case, the danger of inexcusable delay is not great.
Moreover the procedure will result in any event in a clarifica-
tion of the issue in dispute which should tend to promote an
adjustment of the dispute between the parties or a simpler trial
of the issues. It is possible, therefore, that a less complex and
more desirable rule would permit of its use in all civil actions.
The future experience with the remedy in jurisdictions where
STATISTICS OF THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK IN TIIE
FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (1925) 26; JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE WORiK
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPART-
MENT (1926) 26; JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW YORK IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (1927) 26.
3 25 Am. JuD. Soc. BULL., supr note 1.
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it is more freely permitted may be watched with interest to
observe whether further extension is desirable.
Our procedural rules have been designed in large part to avoid
harsh and drastic measures against litigants. In many situa-
tions this purpose is fair and sound. The parties should not be
denied their day in court by mere technical objections. We
should not overlook, however, the objective towards which those
rules should be directed, that of a simple, orderly and prompt pre-
sentation of the substantive issues in dispute between the parties.
The strength of the summary procedure is that it achieves that
objective in many cases. The speed of the procedure is desirable,
but still more to be emphasized is its simplicity and directness
in bringing out the real dispute.321 Some may think of it as in
part a return to the special pleading of the common law. It is,
however, more than that. Like the "summons for direction"
before the masters in chancery in English procedure 327 it leads
to a discovery of the issues under the direct control of the court
and with the penalty of a final disposition of the case if the issues
are not disclosed. We may well prophesy for it a more important
position in future practice systems than merely that of a prod
to delinquent debtors.
-6 Hence a rule should provide a means -hereby issues of lav, arising
from the affidavit, may be passed upon the motion and final judgment be
entered for either the plaintiff or defewdant. Compare the Connecticut
rule, supra p. 441.
327For the English procedure see Judicature Act, Order XMX, Rule 2
and Order LV, Rule 15, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 485, 1097; 1 YEARLY
PRACTICE (1928) 434, 1076; ROSENRAUI, op. cit. supra note 43, at 74 et
seq.; Higgins, English Courts and Proccdure (1924) 7 Am. Jun. Soc. J.
185, 204; cf. Am. JUD. Soc. BULL., -upra note 1, arts. 19 (1), 45; CLArx,
op. cit. supra note 147, at 6, 373.
